Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Indonesian Military Business

Indonesian Military Businesses
I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
II. Businesses Owned by Military

Companies owned in whole or in part by the Indonesian military span the full range of the economy, from agribusiness to manufacturing and from golf courses to banks. In September 2005 the TNI complied with a request from the Ministry of Defense for an inventory of its business interests.[1] (Preparation of the inventory was a first step toward implementing the TNI law passed a year earlier that mandated the transfer of these businesses to government control.) The initial inventory identified 219 military entities (foundations, cooperatives, and foundation companies) engaged in business activity.[2]
As of March 2006, the TNI had provided information on 1,520 individual TNI business units.[3]
(See Data 1, below.) By April 2006, the Ministry of Defense had initiated a separate review process to examine whether its three foundations were engaged in business activity.[4]

Data 1: Inventory of Military Businesses

Initial Inventory (September 2005)
Foundations 25
Companies under Foundations 89
Cooperative Units Engaged in Business 105

Revised Inventory (March 2006)
Total Individual Business Units 1520

Source: Ministry of Defense letter to Human Rights Watch, December 22, 2005; Maj. Gen. Suganda, then TNI spokesman, “TNI commits to reform[,] upholds supremacy of law,” opinion-editorial, Jakarta Post, March 15, 2006.

The TNI and other authorities who have access to the inventory results have not publicly identified the  individual business interests held by the military or provided information on their total value. Officials involved in the review of the military’s businesses declined to share a copy of the inventory with Human Rights Watch, to provide the names of the businesses listed on it, or to reveal the businesses’ total declared value.[5 ]
They said the data supplied by the TNI could not be considered final because it was “very rough” and  included many entities that, in their view, did not constitute “real businesses.”[6]
According to these officials, the list incorporated many small-scale ventures, some with assets of negligible value, alongside other, much larger enterprises.[7]

In the meantime, public statements offer some indications. In mid-2005, unnamed officials told the   Singapore-based Straits Times newspaper that the top twenty or so military companies in Indonesia had a total estimated annual income of $200 million.[8]
For the sake of comparison, perhaps the best available historical figure is one used by foreign finance officials. An “informal review” of a selection of eighty-eight military businesses in Indonesia found that they had a  combined turnover of Rp. 2.9 trillion ($348 million) in 1998/1999.[9] The Far Eastern Economic Review, referring to the same study, further revealed that annual revenue from the selected military businesses  amounted to approximately Rp. 500 billion ($60 million).[10] Contrasting this to the $200 million figure  offered in mid-2005 (which covered a smaller number of companies), it appears that those military businesses that survived the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s were able to rebound significantly from that low point. (See below for additional data specifically for businesses held under military foundations.)

Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Click Here for large diagram


Note: This example is provided here to demonstrate the ownership structure of military businesses and does not purport to make a substantive claim about the businesses listed. It is based on information provided by TNI headquarters and supplemented by two people familiar with the navy’s businesses because they reviewed them (in one case, as part of an internal review by the navy and in the other independently). (Information as of May 2006.)
    
    Link:
Bila ABRI berbisnis: menyingkap data dan kasus penyimpangan dalam praktik bisnis kalangan militerBila ABRI berbisnis: Praktek Bisnis militer
Bisnis militer Orde Baru: Keterlibatan ABRI dalam bidang ekonomi dan pengaruhnya dalam rezim otoriterBisnis militer Orde Baru
Australian Defence Business Review
The Indonesian Military After the New OrderSuharto the smiling generals
Power Politics and the Indonesian MilitaryPower Politics and the Indonesian Military Suharto the smiling generals 


Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military


HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 18, NO. 5(C)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] In the Indonesian language, the defense ministry is called the Department of Defense but it is in English as
usually referred to as the Ministry of Defense.
[2] By comparison, according to a 2001 estimate provided by Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, who
served a first term as defense minister from 1999 to 2000, the military then owned some 250 companies. ICG, “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform,” ICG Asia Report, no. 24, October 11, 2001, p. 13. It is reasonable to assume that the 2001 figure reflected the outcome of an effort Sudarsono announced a year earlier, in which the defense ministry was “cooperating with the TNI headquarters to find out the number of foundations, cooperative units or companies owned by the TNI.” “Indonesian minister warns…,” AFP.
[3] Major General Suganda, “TNI commits to reform…,” Jakarta Post.
[4] Human Rights Watch interview with a person involved in that review, Jakarta, April 18, 2006.
[5] Human Rights Watch interview with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense and former TNI spokesman, Jakarta, April 12, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Said Didu (commonly known as Said Didu, the name used hereafter in this report), secretary of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, Jakarta, April 19, 2006.
[6] The question of how the government would define military business for the purpose of implementing the TNI law’s mandate that these businesses be transferred to government control is discussed further below (see the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform”). Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Said Didu, April 2006.
[7] Ibid.
[8] John McBeth, “Tough job to wind up Armed Forces Inc,” Straits Times, June 4, 2005. The remaining formallyestablished military businesses were considered not to be economically viable. Ibid. Elsewhere, the total value of the military’s business holdings has been estimated, variously, at Rp. 326 billion (more than $35 million), Rp. 10 trillion ($1.06 billion), and more than $8 billion, to offer but a few examples. In most cases, it was unclear how these figures were calculated.
[9] The data was cited in a report prepared for international donors. World Bank, Accelerating Recovery in
Uncertain Times: Brief for the Consultative Group on Indonesia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), p. 29.
[10] John McBeth, “The Army’s Dirty Business,” FEER, November 7, 2002. The article, presumably using 2002 exchange rates, gave the dollar equivalent as $55.5 million.

Book review:
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium (Adelphi series)
Military Reform and Democratisation
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983
Indonesian Military Politics
Our Kind of Guys: The United States and the Indonesian Military
The United States and the Indonesian Military
 
READ MORE - Indonesian Military Business

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Early Indonesian Military Businesses

Indonesian Military Businesses
 I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
A Brief History of Military Economic Activity
The Indonesian military’s involvement in economic activity in Indonesia dates back to the 1945-1949 Indonesian war for independence from the Netherlands. The nascent military was responsible for raising its own funds. In addition to relying on popular backing and material support, in some areas military units turned to smuggling to finance
their operations.

The pattern of self-financing continued after the formation of the Indonesian armed forces (which became known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI, a combined military-police structure until 1999). Official budget allocations to the military were low. As a consequence, throughout the 1950s military commands and units continued to raise their own funds to a large degree. Their fundraising methods went beyond illegal activities such as organized smuggling and illegal levies: Increasingly, military commanders also allied themselves with local businesspeople to generate funds to cover military expenditures. In some cases the military command itself would be granted a stake in a business venture managed by a private partner.
3

Early Military Businesses
The military began to take part in large-scale businesses by the latter part of the 1950s. In the late 1950s, under martial law, the military took over control of Dutch companies. Soon afterwards President Sukarno formally placed the newly nationalized companies under the supervision of senior military personnel. The state takeover of British companies and some United States ones followed in the mid-1960s. Control of these
enterprises was likewise granted to military officers. In part, these moves responded to severe budget shortfalls that resulted in paltry salaries, poor housing, and insufficient clothing and equipment for soldiers.
4

The military also became heavily involved in managing major state-owned enterprises. Oil giant Pertamina and the logistics agency Badan Urusan Logistik (or Bulog) were both dominated by military leadership throughout the 1960s and into the next decade. Profits from military-run companies were commonly directed to the military.
5

This “unconventional financing,” moreover, allowed the government and military leadership to give the appearance of sacrificing military spending in favor of other national priorities.
6

The rapid expansion of the military’s economic engagement in the 1960s extended to the private sector. Much of the growth was from military partnerships with private businesspeople. It was the private entrepreneurs who in fact operated most military-sponsored businesses. The military’s actual contribution to its business ventures typically was nominal: military partners provided licenses and approvals, and helped secure concessions and state contracts.
7

The Situation Today
The September 2004 law mandating that the Indonesian military end its involvement in business was a watershed initiative, but one that left many questions unanswered. The language of the law is subject to multiple interpretations, and the provisions have not yet been enforced. Some preliminary steps have been taken but these have been slow and insufficient: the promise of the law remains untested. A more detailed critique is given below in the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform.” It finds that those in a position to make change happen have not shown a commitment to addressing the full costs of military self-finance, including in human rights terms. To the contrary, they have defined military business narrowly, focusing only on select elements of what is a much deeper structural problem, they have provided a number of exemptions that would leave vast parts of the military’s commercial structure in place, and they have not pursued real accountability. 

  Link:
Human Rights Watch Indonesia the ViolenceHuman Rights Watch Indonesia the Violence
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military.
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983.
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences (Adelphi series).
Indonesian, US militaries join forces to deploy cargo to Lebanon.(GOVERNMENT NEWS*): An article from: Defense Transportation Journal.
U.S. seeks closer ties with Indonesian military; Wolfowitz visited Indonesia for military reasons, not tsunami relief.(Viewpoint): An article from: National Catholic Reporter.
The Indonesian military business complex: Origins, course and future (Working paper / Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University)




Article Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military
 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 18, NO. 5(C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3] Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 250-252, 259-260.
4] Lesley McCulloch, “Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business,” in The Military as an Economic
Actor, Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes , eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 101.
5] Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 275-285; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, p. 252; Danang Widoyoko, Irfan Muktiono, Adnan Topan Husodo, Barly Haliem N, and Agung Wijay, Bisnis Milter Mencari Legitimasi (Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy), (Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and National Democratic Institute, 2003), pp. vi, 27-33. A translation in English is available. See Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, [online]
http://www.indonesia-house.org/dbindhouse/bm/Icw_bis_mil/Daftar_Isi.htm. References in this report, including page citations, refer to the original text rather than the translation.
6] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 274, 277.
7] Ibid., p. 284; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, pp. 252, 268; Widoyoko et al., Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, p. 28. 


Book's review:
"Unkept Promise": Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia
Failure to End Military Business Activity
 
Military & Democracy Indonesia
Military & Democracy Indonesia
The Indonesian Economy since 1966: Southeast Asia's Emerging Giant
The Indonesian Economy since 1966





READ MORE - Early Indonesian Military Businesses

Friday, March 13, 2009

Indonesian Military and U.S. Business

"No Body Knows behind The Fact of Rebellion in Indonesia, We Only know that rebellion is  worst. So who is the most benefit from that rebellion? You'll never predict it before. Open Ur mind 'n eyes."


Indonesian Military and U.S. Business: A Winning Combination?

Reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and a growing consensus within the Bush administration all view the military as central to Indonesia’s stability, especially in the strife ridden provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. But the characterization of the military as a stabilizing force ignores the military’s strong incentives for prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Aceh and Irian Jaya. 


In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch, a researcher for the Bonn International Center for Conversion, describes the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. As much as 80% of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution and illegal casinos and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan.[73] 


Former Defense Minister Juwono conceded in an interview with McCulloch that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence," leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million.[74] In Aceh, soldiers sell their weapons to the guerillas for as little as $6, ensuring their enemies remain a potent force.[75] Many soldiers and officials go so far as to refer to the Aceh fight as a "project," highlighting the role the war plays in filling their pockets, winning them promotions and keeping the institution as a whole powerful and relevant.[76] 


While this is a winning combination for the Indonesian military and multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport, not to mention a vital market for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the people who live and work in the areas "protected" by the Indonesian military gain nothing but more suffering. Until this dynamic can be fully outlined and understood, arguments for arming the Indonesian military in order to ensure stability and end conflict must not be taken at face value.


Related Under this articles: A Stabilizing force by military in Indonesia
 Source:Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001

Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy." 
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense


Link on:
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia-US Military Alliance Is Being Revived; Jakarta Mulls Leaving OPEC.: An article from: APS Diplomat News Service
Disarming politics: if Aceh's military is to leave politics to the people, Indonesia's must as well.(INDONESIA): An article from: New Internationalist


United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years
The Forces Postal Service in Borneo During the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966
Economic Crisis and Vulnerability: The Story from Southeast Asia
Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State (The Ethnography of Political Violence)



Book's review:
Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force (Books and Monographs)
Indonesia's Use of Military Force
Out of Business and on Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia
Out of Business and on Budget

Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia's War over Aceh
Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons
Security Operations in Aceh
 
READ MORE - Indonesian Military and U.S. Business

A Stabilizing Force By Military in Indonesia

Indonesian Military: A Stabilizing Force for Whom?

The most salient arguments for the resumption of military aid are made on behalf of Aceh and Irian Jaya. In these beleaguered provinces separatist movements, recently reinvigorated by East Timor’s hard-won success, have been struggling for decades.

Perhaps that is the reason why Indonesia has many struggle which want own autonomy for their region, control their region by theirself without any force from central government because they think that Central Government not fair for allocate the annual budget to the local region. Bad diplomatic policy in the International court make Indonesia territory become disappear one by one, Indonesia Diplomat can't make a good deal to keeping the Indonesia territory. This situation also worsened by military operations that hedge human rights in the disputes regional. Conflict between local people and military made the situation more complicated.


The Fact in Aceh:

This oil-rich western province is located at the head of the Malacca strait that links the Pacific and Indian oceans-- one of the most strategic waterways in the world. While most Americans would be hard pressed to find Aceh on a map, its oil wealth is key to Jakarta’s power and extremely valuable for U.S. corporations. The New York Times acknowledged Aceh’s centrality when it noted that the province of 4.1 million people, "is far more important to Indonesia’s future and that of South East Asia than East Timor ever was." Aceh’s oil and other commodities contribute 20% of Indonesia’s annual budget, but only 1% is reinvested into the province.

In the late 1980s, in response to the burgeoning movement for independence, Jakarta declared the province a "Military Operations Area" (known by its Indonesian acronym DOM). During the DOM era, thousands of Acehnese civilians were killed, raped, tortured, and abducted. The DOM was lifted in August 1998, but the violence continues. During two days in November 2000, more than a hundred unarmed Acehnese civilians attending a rally were shot dead by security forces. Last year at least one thousand people, mostly civilians and separatists guerrillas, were killed—three times the number killed in 1999. The death toll for this year has already exceeded 1,100.

For the most part, the war in Aceh has taken place beneath the radar screen of Western media and politics. But two brutal incidents in late 2000 brought the plight the Acehnese and the role of U.S. weapons to the front pages of American newspapers. Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a prominent Acehnese lawyer with permanent residence in the U.S., was working for human rights and a peaceful resolution to the conflict when he was disappeared, tortured and murdered. His body was found in September 2000 along with four other unidentified bodies in an area that the military frequently uses to dispose of bodies. A few months later, "military death squads" killed three Acehnese working for a Danish aid group. A survivor of the attack was able to give his testimony to Human Rights Watch before going into hiding. He reported that the leader "carried a machine gun, I think it was an M-16, and had an FN pistol on his waist. Another one had a machine gun with a grenade launcher attached. The commander…had a pistol and an automatic rifle, most of the others also carried rifles."

From the U.S. perspective, Aceh is important as a location for U.S.-owned oil companies, but their presence has not encouraged respect for human rights. ExxonMobil, the largest publicly held corporation in the United States, has a huge oil and gas operation in Aceh. The company was sued in June by International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of eleven Acehnese who lived and worked near ExxonMobil’s operations. The villagers contend that they and their families have been the victims of murder, torture, kidnapping and rape at the hands of Indonesian military units guarding ExxonMobil’s gas fields. The suit, filed in Washington, DC, charges that the company provided the Indonesian military with logistical and material support, including:

• Buildings used by the Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) units to "interrogate, torture and murder Acehnese civilians."
• Heavy equipment like excavators used by the military to dig mass graves.
• Access to ExxonMobil constructed roads to transport victims to mass grave sites.

This collaboration demonstrates the two party’s mutual goal of maintaining Indonesian control of the province. The IFRF suit claims that the ExxonMobil fears that the "creation of an independent state for the people of Aceh as the result of a democratic uprising" would nullify their "business arrangement with the Indonesian government." Until March 2000, when ExxonMobil suspended operations after a spate of attacks on their pipeline, Jakarta received an estimated $100 million in revenue from the company every month. In an effort to ensure their revenue stream and reassure ExxonMobil, Jakarta sent three additional battalions of troops and an armored calvary unit to beef up security in the region. ExxonMobil resumed limited production a few months later.

Related under this Articles: Indonesia Military and U.S business

Source: Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001

Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy."
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense



Link on:
Masters of terror: Indonesia's military & violence in East Timor in 1999 (Canberra papers on strategy & defence) 
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia) 
Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966 (Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948-1975) 


Book's review:

Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor (World Social Change)
Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor
Security, Development and Nation-Building in Timor-Leste: A Cross-sectoral Assessment (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Security, and Development in Timor Leste

Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture
Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, and Justice in Cambodia and East Timor
Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture

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