Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Indonesian Military Business

Indonesian Military Businesses
I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
II. Businesses Owned by Military

Companies owned in whole or in part by the Indonesian military span the full range of the economy, from agribusiness to manufacturing and from golf courses to banks. In September 2005 the TNI complied with a request from the Ministry of Defense for an inventory of its business interests.[1] (Preparation of the inventory was a first step toward implementing the TNI law passed a year earlier that mandated the transfer of these businesses to government control.) The initial inventory identified 219 military entities (foundations, cooperatives, and foundation companies) engaged in business activity.[2]
As of March 2006, the TNI had provided information on 1,520 individual TNI business units.[3]
(See Data 1, below.) By April 2006, the Ministry of Defense had initiated a separate review process to examine whether its three foundations were engaged in business activity.[4]

Data 1: Inventory of Military Businesses

Initial Inventory (September 2005)
Foundations 25
Companies under Foundations 89
Cooperative Units Engaged in Business 105

Revised Inventory (March 2006)
Total Individual Business Units 1520

Source: Ministry of Defense letter to Human Rights Watch, December 22, 2005; Maj. Gen. Suganda, then TNI spokesman, “TNI commits to reform[,] upholds supremacy of law,” opinion-editorial, Jakarta Post, March 15, 2006.

The TNI and other authorities who have access to the inventory results have not publicly identified the  individual business interests held by the military or provided information on their total value. Officials involved in the review of the military’s businesses declined to share a copy of the inventory with Human Rights Watch, to provide the names of the businesses listed on it, or to reveal the businesses’ total declared value.[5 ]
They said the data supplied by the TNI could not be considered final because it was “very rough” and  included many entities that, in their view, did not constitute “real businesses.”[6]
According to these officials, the list incorporated many small-scale ventures, some with assets of negligible value, alongside other, much larger enterprises.[7]

In the meantime, public statements offer some indications. In mid-2005, unnamed officials told the   Singapore-based Straits Times newspaper that the top twenty or so military companies in Indonesia had a total estimated annual income of $200 million.[8]
For the sake of comparison, perhaps the best available historical figure is one used by foreign finance officials. An “informal review” of a selection of eighty-eight military businesses in Indonesia found that they had a  combined turnover of Rp. 2.9 trillion ($348 million) in 1998/1999.[9] The Far Eastern Economic Review, referring to the same study, further revealed that annual revenue from the selected military businesses  amounted to approximately Rp. 500 billion ($60 million).[10] Contrasting this to the $200 million figure  offered in mid-2005 (which covered a smaller number of companies), it appears that those military businesses that survived the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s were able to rebound significantly from that low point. (See below for additional data specifically for businesses held under military foundations.)

Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Click Here for large diagram

Note: This example is provided here to demonstrate the ownership structure of military businesses and does not purport to make a substantive claim about the businesses listed. It is based on information provided by TNI headquarters and supplemented by two people familiar with the navy’s businesses because they reviewed them (in one case, as part of an internal review by the navy and in the other independently). (Information as of May 2006.)
Bila ABRI berbisnis: menyingkap data dan kasus penyimpangan dalam praktik bisnis kalangan militerBila ABRI berbisnis: Praktek Bisnis militer
Bisnis militer Orde Baru: Keterlibatan ABRI dalam bidang ekonomi dan pengaruhnya dalam rezim otoriterBisnis militer Orde Baru
Australian Defence Business Review
The Indonesian Military After the New OrderSuharto the smiling generals
Power Politics and the Indonesian MilitaryPower Politics and the Indonesian Military Suharto the smiling generals 

Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military

[1] In the Indonesian language, the defense ministry is called the Department of Defense but it is in English as
usually referred to as the Ministry of Defense.
[2] By comparison, according to a 2001 estimate provided by Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, who
served a first term as defense minister from 1999 to 2000, the military then owned some 250 companies. ICG, “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform,” ICG Asia Report, no. 24, October 11, 2001, p. 13. It is reasonable to assume that the 2001 figure reflected the outcome of an effort Sudarsono announced a year earlier, in which the defense ministry was “cooperating with the TNI headquarters to find out the number of foundations, cooperative units or companies owned by the TNI.” “Indonesian minister warns…,” AFP.
[3] Major General Suganda, “TNI commits to reform…,” Jakarta Post.
[4] Human Rights Watch interview with a person involved in that review, Jakarta, April 18, 2006.
[5] Human Rights Watch interview with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense and former TNI spokesman, Jakarta, April 12, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Said Didu (commonly known as Said Didu, the name used hereafter in this report), secretary of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, Jakarta, April 19, 2006.
[6] The question of how the government would define military business for the purpose of implementing the TNI law’s mandate that these businesses be transferred to government control is discussed further below (see the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform”). Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Said Didu, April 2006.
[7] Ibid.
[8] John McBeth, “Tough job to wind up Armed Forces Inc,” Straits Times, June 4, 2005. The remaining formallyestablished military businesses were considered not to be economically viable. Ibid. Elsewhere, the total value of the military’s business holdings has been estimated, variously, at Rp. 326 billion (more than $35 million), Rp. 10 trillion ($1.06 billion), and more than $8 billion, to offer but a few examples. In most cases, it was unclear how these figures were calculated.
[9] The data was cited in a report prepared for international donors. World Bank, Accelerating Recovery in
Uncertain Times: Brief for the Consultative Group on Indonesia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), p. 29.
[10] John McBeth, “The Army’s Dirty Business,” FEER, November 7, 2002. The article, presumably using 2002 exchange rates, gave the dollar equivalent as $55.5 million.

Book review:
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium (Adelphi series)
Military Reform and Democratisation
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983
Indonesian Military Politics
Our Kind of Guys: The United States and the Indonesian Military
The United States and the Indonesian Military
READ MORE - Indonesian Military Business

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CoW : Contract of Work
EIA : Environmental Investigation Agency
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
ICW :  Indonesia Corruption Watch
IMF : International Monetary Fund
ITCI : International Timber Corporation Indonesia
MPs : Members of Parliament
NGO : Nongovernmental Organization
OECD : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PER : Public Expenditure Review
ROSC : Report on Standards and Observance of Code
SIPRI : Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

ABK:  Agrosilva Beta Kartika ( Indonesian company, BOT subsidiary )
ABRI: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik; Indonesia, ( Indonesian armed forces before 1999, a combined military-police structure )
BOT : Beta Omega Technologies ( Malaysian company )
BPK : Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan ( Supreme Audit Agency )
Brimob : Brigade Mobil ( Mobile Brigade, paramilitary police commandos )
BTPB : Badan Transformasi dan Pengelolaan Bisnis TNI ( TNI Business Transformation and Management Body )
Bulog:  Badan Urusan Logistik ( Logistics agency )
DPR : Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat ( House of Representatives )
Inkopad Induk Koperasi Angkatan Darat ( Army Parent Cooperative Board )
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer ( Regional Military Command )
Kodim Komando Distrik Militer ( District Military Command )
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus ( Army Special Forces Command )
Korem Komando Resort Militer ( Sub Regional Military Command )
Kostrad Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat ( Army Strategic Reserve Command )
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi ( Corruption Eradication Commission )
Linud Lintas Udara ( Airborne Unit )
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat ( People’s Consultative Assembly )
Primkopad Primer Koperasi Angkatan Darat ( Army Primary Cooperative )
PT Perseroan Terbatas ( Designation for a privately-held corporation )
Puskopad Pusat Koperasi Angkatan Darat ( Army Central Cooperative )
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia ( Indonesian armed forces since 1999 )
TSTB Tim Supervisi Transformasi Bisnis TNI ( Supervisory Team for the Transformation of TNI Businesses )
Walhi Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia ( Forum on the Environment in Indonesia )
Yakobame Yayasan Kesejahteraan Korps Baret Merah ( Kopassus foundation )
Yamabri Yayasan Markas Besar ABRI TNI ( headquarters foundation )
Yashbhum Yayasan Bhumyamca ( Navy foundation )
Yasua Yayasan Adi Upaya ( Air Force foundation )
YDPK Yayasan Dharma Putra ( Kostrad Former name of YKSDP Kostrad )
YKBPS Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman ( Ministry of Defense foundation )
YKEP Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi ( Army foundation )
YKPP Yayasan Kesejahteraan Perumahan Prajurit ( Ministry of Defense foundation )
YKSDP Kostrad Yayasan Kesejahteraan Sosial Dharma Putra (Kostrad foundation )
YSBP Yayasan Satya Bhakti Pertiwi ( Ministry of Defense foundation )

Index of Conference Proceedings : Directory of AcronymsDirectory of Acronyms
Acronyms For You
AAA (Acronym And Abbreviation)cronym And Abbreviation
Dictionary of Medical Acronyms & Abbreviations 
Business AcronymsDirectory of Business Acronyms

Stedman's Medical Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols (Stedman's Abbreviations, Acronyms & Symbols)
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A Guide to Federal Terms and Acronyms
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Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Early Indonesian Military Businesses

Indonesian Military Businesses
 I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
A Brief History of Military Economic Activity
The Indonesian military’s involvement in economic activity in Indonesia dates back to the 1945-1949 Indonesian war for independence from the Netherlands. The nascent military was responsible for raising its own funds. In addition to relying on popular backing and material support, in some areas military units turned to smuggling to finance
their operations.

The pattern of self-financing continued after the formation of the Indonesian armed forces (which became known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI, a combined military-police structure until 1999). Official budget allocations to the military were low. As a consequence, throughout the 1950s military commands and units continued to raise their own funds to a large degree. Their fundraising methods went beyond illegal activities such as organized smuggling and illegal levies: Increasingly, military commanders also allied themselves with local businesspeople to generate funds to cover military expenditures. In some cases the military command itself would be granted a stake in a business venture managed by a private partner.

Early Military Businesses
The military began to take part in large-scale businesses by the latter part of the 1950s. In the late 1950s, under martial law, the military took over control of Dutch companies. Soon afterwards President Sukarno formally placed the newly nationalized companies under the supervision of senior military personnel. The state takeover of British companies and some United States ones followed in the mid-1960s. Control of these
enterprises was likewise granted to military officers. In part, these moves responded to severe budget shortfalls that resulted in paltry salaries, poor housing, and insufficient clothing and equipment for soldiers.

The military also became heavily involved in managing major state-owned enterprises. Oil giant Pertamina and the logistics agency Badan Urusan Logistik (or Bulog) were both dominated by military leadership throughout the 1960s and into the next decade. Profits from military-run companies were commonly directed to the military.

This “unconventional financing,” moreover, allowed the government and military leadership to give the appearance of sacrificing military spending in favor of other national priorities.

The rapid expansion of the military’s economic engagement in the 1960s extended to the private sector. Much of the growth was from military partnerships with private businesspeople. It was the private entrepreneurs who in fact operated most military-sponsored businesses. The military’s actual contribution to its business ventures typically was nominal: military partners provided licenses and approvals, and helped secure concessions and state contracts.

The Situation Today
The September 2004 law mandating that the Indonesian military end its involvement in business was a watershed initiative, but one that left many questions unanswered. The language of the law is subject to multiple interpretations, and the provisions have not yet been enforced. Some preliminary steps have been taken but these have been slow and insufficient: the promise of the law remains untested. A more detailed critique is given below in the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform.” It finds that those in a position to make change happen have not shown a commitment to addressing the full costs of military self-finance, including in human rights terms. To the contrary, they have defined military business narrowly, focusing only on select elements of what is a much deeper structural problem, they have provided a number of exemptions that would leave vast parts of the military’s commercial structure in place, and they have not pursued real accountability. 

Human Rights Watch Indonesia the ViolenceHuman Rights Watch Indonesia the Violence
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military.
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983.
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences (Adelphi series).
Indonesian, US militaries join forces to deploy cargo to Lebanon.(GOVERNMENT NEWS*): An article from: Defense Transportation Journal.
U.S. seeks closer ties with Indonesian military; Wolfowitz visited Indonesia for military reasons, not tsunami relief.(Viewpoint): An article from: National Catholic Reporter.
The Indonesian military business complex: Origins, course and future (Working paper / Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University)

Article Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military
3] Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 250-252, 259-260.
4] Lesley McCulloch, “Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business,” in The Military as an Economic
Actor, Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes , eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 101.
5] Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 275-285; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, p. 252; Danang Widoyoko, Irfan Muktiono, Adnan Topan Husodo, Barly Haliem N, and Agung Wijay, Bisnis Milter Mencari Legitimasi (Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy), (Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and National Democratic Institute, 2003), pp. vi, 27-33. A translation in English is available. See Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, [online] References in this report, including page citations, refer to the original text rather than the translation.
6] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 274, 277.
7] Ibid., p. 284; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, pp. 252, 268; Widoyoko et al., Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, p. 28. 

Book's review:
"Unkept Promise": Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia
Failure to End Military Business Activity
Military & Democracy Indonesia
Military & Democracy Indonesia
The Indonesian Economy since 1966: Southeast Asia's Emerging Giant
The Indonesian Economy since 1966

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Thursday, May 26, 2011

Indonesian History

A brief history of Indonesia
Indonesian History past till nowadays, from Renaissance empire to Republic of Indonesia
By the time of the Renaissance, the islands of Java and Sumatra had already enjoyed a 1,000-year heritage of advanced civilization spanning two major empires. During the 7th-14th centuries, the Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya flourished on Sumatra. At its peak, the Srivijaya Empire reached as far as West Java and the Malay Peninsula. Also by the 14th century, the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit had risen in eastern Java. Gadjah Mada, the empire's chief minister from 1331 to 1364, succeeded in gaining allegiance from most of what is now modern Indonesia and much of the Malay archipelago as well. Legacies from Gadjah Mada's time include a codification of law and an epic poem. Islam arrived in Indonesia sometime during the 12th century and, through assimilation, supplanted Hinduism by the end of the 16th century in Java and Sumatra. Bali, however, remains overwhelmingly Hindu. In the eastern archipelago, both Christian and Islamic proselytizing took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, and, currently, there are large communities of both religions on these islands.

Beginning in 1602, the Dutch slowly established themselves as rulers of Indonesia, exploiting the weakness of the small kingdoms that had replaced that of Majapahit. The only exception was East Timor, which remained under Portugal's control until 1975. During 300 years of rule, the Dutch developed the Netherlands East Indies into one of the world's richest colonial possessions.
During the first decade of the 20th century, an Indonesian independence movement began and expanded rapidly, particularly between the two World Wars. Its leaders came from a small group of young professionals and students, some of whom had been educated in the Netherlands. Many, including Indonesia's first president, Soekarno (1945-67), were imprisoned for political activities.

The Japanese occupied Indonesia for 3 years during World War II (1942-1945). On August 17, 1945, 3 days after the Japanese surrender to the Allies, a small group of Indonesians, led by Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, proclaimed independence and established the Republic of Indonesia. They set up a provisional government and adopted a constitution to govern the republic until elections could be held and a new constitution written. Dutch efforts to reestablish complete control met strong resistance. After 4 years of warfare and negotiations, the Dutch transferred sovereignty to a federal Indonesian Government. In 1950, Indonesia became the 60th member of the United Nations.

Link on: 
Japanese Experience Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945 (Ohio RIS Southeast Asia Series) 
The Defining Years of the Dutch East Indies, 1942-1949: Survivors Accounts of Japanese Invasion and Enslavement of Europeans and the Revolution That Created Free Indonesia 
The Collapse of a Colonial Society: The Dutch in Indonesia During the Second World War (Verhandelingen Van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde) 

Shortly after hostilities with the Dutch ended in 1949, Indonesia adopted a new constitution, providing for a parliamentary system of government in which the executive was chosen by and accountable to parliament. Parliament was divided among many political parties before and after the country's first nationwide election in 1955, and stable governmental coalitions were difficult to achieve. The role of Islam in Indonesia became a divisive issue. Soekarno defended a secular state based on Pancasila, five principles of the state philosophy--monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, representative democracy by consensus, and social justice--codified in the 1945 constitution, while some Muslim groups preferred either an Islamic state or a constitution that included a preambular provision requiring adherents of Islam to be subject to Islamic law. At the time of independence, the Dutch retained control over the western half of New Guinea (known as Irian Jaya in the Soekarno and Suharto eras and as Papua since 2000) and permitted steps toward self-government and independence.

Negotiations with the Dutch on the incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesia failed, and armed clashes broke out between Indonesian and Dutch troops in 1961. In August 1962, the two sides reached an agreement, and Indonesia assumed administrative responsibility for Irian Jaya on May 1, 1963. The Indonesian Government conducted an "Act of Free Choice" in Irian Jaya under UN supervision in 1969 in which 1,025 Papuan representatives of local councils agreed by consensus to remain a part of Indonesia. A subsequent UN General Assembly resolution confirmed the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Opposition to Indonesian administration of Papua gave rise to small-scale guerrilla activity in the years following Jakarta's assumption of control. In the more open atmosphere since 1998, there have been more explicit expressions within Papua calling for independence from Indonesia.

Unsuccessful rebellions on Sumatra, Sulawesi, West Java, and other islands beginning in 1958, plus a failure by the constituent assembly to develop a new constitution, weakened the parliamentary system. Consequently, in 1959, when President Soekarno unilaterally revived the provisional 1945 constitution that provided for broad presidential powers, he met little resistance. From 1959 to 1965, President Soekarno imposed an authoritarian regime under the label of "Guided Democracy." He also moved Indonesia's foreign policy toward nonalignment, a foreign policy stance supported by other prominent leaders of former colonies who rejected formal alliances with either the West or Soviet bloc. Under Soekarno's auspices, these leaders gathered in Bandung, West Java, in 1955 to lay the groundwork for what became known as the Non-Aligned Movement. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, President Soekarno moved closer to Asian communist states and toward the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in domestic affairs. Though the PKI represented the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union and China, its mass support base never demonstrated an ideological adherence typical of communist parties in other countries.

Link on:
Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno: 1959-1965
Indonesian Communism: A History
The Rise of Indonesian Communism
The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959

By 1965, the PKI controlled many of the mass civic and cultural organizations that Soekarno had established to mobilize support for his regime and, with Soekarno's acquiescence, embarked on a campaign to establish a "Fifth Column" by arming its supporters. Army leaders resisted this campaign. Under circumstances that have never been fully explained, on October 1, 1965, PKI sympathizers within the military, including elements from Soekarno's palace guard, occupied key locations in Jakarta and kidnapped and murdered six senior generals. Major General Suharto, the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, rallied army troops opposed to the PKI to reestablish control over the city. Violence swept throughout Indonesia in the aftermath of the October 1 events, and unsettled conditions persisted through 1966. Right-wing gangs killed tens of thousands of alleged communists in rural areas. Estimates of the number of deaths range between 160,000 and 500,000. The violence was especially brutal in Java and Bali. During this period, PKI members by the tens of thousands turned in their membership cards. The emotions and fears of instability created by this crisis persisted for many years as the communist party remains banned from Indonesia.

Throughout the 1965-66 period, President Soekarno vainly attempted to restore his political stature and shift the country back to its pre-October 1965 position. Although he remained President, in March 1966, Soekarno transferred key political and military powers to General Suharto, who by that time had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) named General Suharto acting President. Soekarno ceased to be a political force and lived under virtual house arrest until his death in 1970.

President Suharto proclaimed a "New Order" in Indonesian politics and dramatically shifted foreign and domestic policies away from the course set in Soekarno's final years. The New Order established economic rehabilitation and development as its primary goals and pursued its policies through an administrative structure dominated by the military but with advice from Western-educated economic experts. In 1968, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) formally selected Suharto to a full 5-year term as President, and he was reelected to successive 5-year terms in 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998. In mid-1997, Indonesia suffered from the Asian financial and economic crisis, accompanied by the worst drought in 50 years and falling prices for oil, gas, and other commodity exports. As the exchange rate changed from a fixed to a managed float to fully floating, the rupiah (IDR or Rp) depreciated in value, inflation increased significantly, and capital flight accelerated. Demonstrators, initially led by students, called for Suharto's resignation. Amid widespread civil unrest, Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998, 3 months after the MPR had selected him for a seventh term. Suharto's hand-picked Vice President, B.J. Habibie, became Indonesia's third President. President Habibie reestablished International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor community support for an economic stabilization program. He released several prominent political and labor prisoners, initiated investigations into the unrest, and lifted controls on the press, political parties, and labor unions.

In January 1999, Habibie and the Indonesian Government agreed to a process, with UN involvement, under which the people of East Timor would be allowed to choose between autonomy and independence through a direct ballot held on August 30, 1999. Some 98% of registered voters cast their ballots, and 78.5% of the voters chose independence over continued integration with Indonesia. Many people were killed by Indonesian military forces and military-backed militias in a wave of violence and destruction after the announcement of the pro-independence vote.

Link on:
Suharto: A Political BiographySuharto: A Political Biography
Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto
General Wiranto: The man emerging from the midst of Indonesian reformation : a political analysis
Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi Indonesia,1892-1995 (Anthropological Horizons)

Indonesia's first elections in the post-Suharto period were held for the national, provincial, and sub-provincial parliaments on June 7, 1999. Forty-eight political parties participated in the elections. For the national parliament, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri) won 34% of the vote; Golkar ("Functional Groups" party) 22%; Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party, linked to the conservative Islamic organization Nadhlatul Ulama headed by former President Abdurrahman Wahid) 13%; and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party, led by Hamzah Haz) 11%. The MPR selected Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia's fourth President in November 1999 and replaced him with Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001.

The constitution, as amended in the post-Suharto era, provides for the direct election by popular vote of the president and vice president. Under the 2004 amendment, only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 3% of the House of Representatives (DPR) seats or 5% of the vote in national legislative elections were eligible to nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket.

The 2004 legislative elections took place on April 5 and were considered to be generally free and fair. Twenty-four parties took part in the elections. Big parties lost ground, while small parties gained larger shares of the vote. However, the two Suharto-era nationalist parties, PDI-P and Golkar, remained in the lead. PDI-P (opposition party during the Suharto era) lost its plurality in the House of Representatives, dropping from 33% to 18.5% of the total vote (and from 33% to 20% of the seats). The Golkar Party (Suharto’s political party) declined slightly from 1999 levels, going from 22% to 21% of the national vote (from 26% to 23% of DPR seats). The third- and fourth-largest parties (by vote share) were two Islamic-oriented parties, the United Development Party (PPP) (8% of the votes, 10.5% of the seats) and National Awakening Party (PKB) (10.5% of the vote, 9.45% of the seats). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s nationalist Democratic Party (PD) won 7.45% of the national vote and 10% of the DPR seats, making it the fourth-largest party in the DPR. Seven of the 24 parties won no DPR seats; six won 1-2 seats, and the other six won between 2%-6% of the national vote (between 5-52 DPR seats).

The first direct presidential election was held on July 5, 2004, contested by five tickets. As no candidate won at least 50% of the vote, a runoff election was held on September 20, 2004, between the top two candidates, President Megawati Sukarnoputri and retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In this final round, Yudhoyono won 60.6% of the vote. Approximately 76.6% of the eligible voters participated, a total of roughly 117 million people, making Indonesia's presidential election the largest single-day election in the world. The Carter Center, which sent a delegation of election observers, issued a statement congratulating "the people and leaders of Indonesia for the successful conduct of the presidential election and the peaceful atmosphere that has prevailed throughout the ongoing democratic transition."

In 2009, national legislative elections were held on April 9 and presidential elections were held in July. They were peaceful and considered free and fair. New electoral rules required that a party win 2.5% of the national vote in order to enter parliament. A total of thirty-eight national and six local (Aceh only) parties contested the 2009 legislative elections. At least 171 million voters registered to vote in these elections. Voter turnout was estimated to be 71% of the electorate. Nine parties won parliamentary seats in the House of Representatives (DPR). The top three winners were secular nationalist parties: President Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat, with 20.85% of the vote; Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s Golkar Party, 14.45%; and former president Megawati’s opposition PDI-P party, with 14.03%. The next four largest parties were all Islamic-oriented parties: PKS, PAN (6%), PPP (5.3%), and PKB (4.9%). Only PKS maintained its 2004 vote share (7.88%); the other three declined significantly in popularity. The smallest two parties in Parliament, Gerindra and Hanura, with 4.46 and 3.77% of the vote respectively, are run by retired Suharto-era army generals Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto (one name only). The 2009 DPR members took their seats October 1.

Also in 2009, the threshold was revised so that only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 20% of the House of Representatives (DPR) seats or 25% of the vote in the 2009 national legislative elections would be eligible to nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket. Partai Demokrat, Golkar, and PDI-P parties, the top winners in the legislative elections, nominated presidential candidates. To win in one round, a presidential candidate was required to receive more than 50% of the vote and more than 20% of the vote in 17 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces. If no candidate did so, the top two candidates would have competed in a second round in September 2009.

Three tickets competed in the presidential elections. Incumbent President Yudhoyono and his running mate, non-partisan former Central Bank Chair and Economics Minister Boediono, won the election with such a significant plurality--60.6%--that it obviated the need for a second round of elections. Main challenger and former president and opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri and running mate Prabowo Subianto trailed with 28%. Meanwhile, Vice President Jusuf Kalla and running mate Wiranto came in last at 12.7%. Indonesia’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) inaugurated President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for his second term as president on October 20, 2009.

Natural disasters have devastated many parts of Indonesia over the past few years. On December 26, 2004, a 9.1 to 9.3 magnitude earthquake took place in the Indian Ocean, and the resulting tsunami killed over 130,000 people in Aceh and left more than 500,000 homeless. On March 26, 2005, an 8.7 magnitude earthquake struck between Aceh and northern Sumatra, killing 905 people and displacing tens of thousands. After much media attention on the seismic activity on Mt. Merapi in April and May 2006, a 6.2 magnitude earthquake occurred 30 miles to the southwest. It killed more than 5,000 people and left an estimated 200,000 people homeless in the Yogyakarta region. An earthquake of 7.4 struck Tasikmalaya, West Java, on September 2, 2009, killing approximately 100 people. On September 30, 2009, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck Western Sumatra. There have been no official statistics released on deaths and injuries; however, press reports indicated more than 1,100 fatalities.

Book's Review:
The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War (Handbook of Oriental Studies)
The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War
War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (Japan in the Modern World)
War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation
Appel: The Story of a European Family in Indonesia and Japanese Concentration Camp
Appel: The Story of a European Family in Indonesia and Japanese Concentration Camp
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