How Important Are U.S. Arms for Soeharto Regime
During the 1977 House International Relations Committee hearing, George H. Aldrich, the State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor, testified that "roughly 90%" of Indonesia's weapons during the time of the 1975 invasion of East Timor came from the United States. As one high-ranking Indonesian general bluntly pointed out, "Of course there were US weapons used [during the attack on East Timor]. These are the only weapons that we have."
During Indonesia's prolonged battle to occupy the island of East Timor, US-supplied counterinsurgency aircraft also proved essential. Certainly one of the deadliest weapons in Indonesia's arsenal was the US-supplied OV-10 Bronco, especially designed for close-combat, which is equipped with infared detectors, and can carry up to 3600 pounds of ordnance, grenade launchers, rockets, napalm, and machine guns. In the late 1970s, Indonesia used OV-10 Broncos and other US-supplied equipment to carry out extensive and continuous bombing missions in the interior highlands, eradicating crops and forcing 300,000 East Timorese to flee to the Indonesian-controlled lowlands. From there, refugees were herded into concentration camps, where thousands died of starvation and disease.
Although Jakarta has diversified its weapons sources since that time, turning to Britain, France, Germany and others to round out its arsenal, U.S. supplies remain essential. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1992 to 1994 (the most recent years for which full data is available), Indonesia received 53% of its weapons imports from the United States. Since the mid-1980s, Indonesia has relied almost entirely on the United States and its Western European allies (particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) for its imported armaments, obtaining anywhere from 91 to 100% of its imported weapons from U.S. or Western European sources over this time period.
Major deals with European powers have included imports of 20 105mm howitzers from France, several squadrons of Hawk fighter jets from the United Kingdom, and dozens of combat ships from Germany (equipment that belonged to the former East German navy).This concentration of imports from the U.S. and its key European allies suggest that a coordinated policy among these nations to limit arms to Indonesia in exchange for improvements in human rights and withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor could have a considerable impact in shaping Indonesian policy. With a handful of close allies supplying most of Indonesia's weaponry, the old argument that "if we don't sell it, somebody else will" rings particularly hollow.
Table II provides data on the major sources of arms to Indonesia from 1978 through 1994, based on data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (see p. 10, below). Because Indonesia has accumulated so much U.S. weaponry in the past two decades, there is also a brisk trade in spare parts and upgrades for U.S. systems that are already in Jakarta's arsenal. According to data supplied by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), in Fiscal Year 1994 U.S. companies received 198 licenses for the export of $88.3 million worth of weapons and weapons components to Indonesia; in F.Y. 1995, the Department granted 248 licenses for items worth more than $221 million.
The majority of these licenses will not result in final sales; historically only about one-sixth to one-third of the value of licenses granted to a given country result in actual sales. Nevertheless, even if $50 to $100 million of the $309 million in licenses approved during 1994 and 1995 result in transfers of arms and arms technology to Indonesia, that will represent a significant boost to the Indonesian military. Among the items licensed are millions of dollars in spare parts for Indonesia's U.S.-origin A-4, F-5, F-16, and C-130 aircraft; spare parts for armored combat vehicles and Sidewinder missiles; and small licenses for spare night vision scopes for U.S. made rifles, pistols and revolvers, and ammunition manufacturing.
During the 1977 House International Relations Committee hearing, George H. Aldrich, the State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor, testified that "roughly 90%" of Indonesia's weapons during the time of the 1975 invasion of East Timor came from the United States. As one high-ranking Indonesian general bluntly pointed out, "Of course there were US weapons used [during the attack on East Timor]. These are the only weapons that we have."
During Indonesia's prolonged battle to occupy the island of East Timor, US-supplied counterinsurgency aircraft also proved essential. Certainly one of the deadliest weapons in Indonesia's arsenal was the US-supplied OV-10 Bronco, especially designed for close-combat, which is equipped with infared detectors, and can carry up to 3600 pounds of ordnance, grenade launchers, rockets, napalm, and machine guns. In the late 1970s, Indonesia used OV-10 Broncos and other US-supplied equipment to carry out extensive and continuous bombing missions in the interior highlands, eradicating crops and forcing 300,000 East Timorese to flee to the Indonesian-controlled lowlands. From there, refugees were herded into concentration camps, where thousands died of starvation and disease.
Although Jakarta has diversified its weapons sources since that time, turning to Britain, France, Germany and others to round out its arsenal, U.S. supplies remain essential. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1992 to 1994 (the most recent years for which full data is available), Indonesia received 53% of its weapons imports from the United States. Since the mid-1980s, Indonesia has relied almost entirely on the United States and its Western European allies (particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) for its imported armaments, obtaining anywhere from 91 to 100% of its imported weapons from U.S. or Western European sources over this time period.
Major deals with European powers have included imports of 20 105mm howitzers from France, several squadrons of Hawk fighter jets from the United Kingdom, and dozens of combat ships from Germany (equipment that belonged to the former East German navy).This concentration of imports from the U.S. and its key European allies suggest that a coordinated policy among these nations to limit arms to Indonesia in exchange for improvements in human rights and withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor could have a considerable impact in shaping Indonesian policy. With a handful of close allies supplying most of Indonesia's weaponry, the old argument that "if we don't sell it, somebody else will" rings particularly hollow.
Table II provides data on the major sources of arms to Indonesia from 1978 through 1994, based on data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (see p. 10, below). Because Indonesia has accumulated so much U.S. weaponry in the past two decades, there is also a brisk trade in spare parts and upgrades for U.S. systems that are already in Jakarta's arsenal. According to data supplied by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), in Fiscal Year 1994 U.S. companies received 198 licenses for the export of $88.3 million worth of weapons and weapons components to Indonesia; in F.Y. 1995, the Department granted 248 licenses for items worth more than $221 million.
The majority of these licenses will not result in final sales; historically only about one-sixth to one-third of the value of licenses granted to a given country result in actual sales. Nevertheless, even if $50 to $100 million of the $309 million in licenses approved during 1994 and 1995 result in transfers of arms and arms technology to Indonesia, that will represent a significant boost to the Indonesian military. Among the items licensed are millions of dollars in spare parts for Indonesia's U.S.-origin A-4, F-5, F-16, and C-130 aircraft; spare parts for armored combat vehicles and Sidewinder missiles; and small licenses for spare night vision scopes for U.S. made rifles, pistols and revolvers, and ammunition manufacturing.
| Table II: Major Arms Suppliers to Indonesia 1978-1994 | ||
| Years | Total Arms Imports | Top Suppliers (by %) |
| 1992-1994 | $170 million | U.S. 53% Germany 47% Total, Top 2: 100% |
| 1991-1993 | $210 million | France 47% U.S. 33% Germany 19% Total, Top 3: 99% |
| 1987-1991 | $950 million | U.S. 37% France 14% Other Western European 45% Total from U.S./Western Europe: 96% |
| 1985-1989 | $770 million | U.S. 26% United Kingdom 10% Other Western European 55% Total from U.S./Western Europe: 91% |
| 1984-1988 | $715 million | U.S. 29% United Kingdom 15% Total, Top 2: 44% |
| 1982-1986 | $750 million | U.S. 25% U.K. 13% France 13% Total, Top 3: 51% |
| 1979-1983 | $1,360 million | U.S. 20% France 15% U.K. 7% Total, Top 3: 42% |
| 1978-1982 | $1,300 million | U.S. 19% Germany 11% France 9% Total, Top 3: 39% |
Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, editions covering, 1993-94, 1991-92, 1990, 1989, 1987, 1985, and 1972-82. Corporate Culprits
Among the U.S. corporations that are profiting from arms sales to Indonesia are Lockheed Martin (maker of the F-16 and the C-130 transport, both of which have been shipped to Indonesia); Textron (whose Cadillac Gage and Bell Helicopter divisions have supplied armored vehicles and military helicopters to the Jakarta regime); Colt Industries (which has sold thousands of M-16 rifles to the Indonesian armed forces); and General Motors/Hughes (which has sold 500MD helicopters to Jakarta as well as air-to-air missiles)
Related under articles: U.S Arms transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?
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| Human Rights, Politics and Corruption in Indonesia |
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| Indonesia in the Soeharto Years |
