Showing posts with label Indonesian Military Business. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Indonesian Military Business. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Indonesian Military Business

Indonesian Military Businesses
I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
II. Businesses Owned by Military

Companies owned in whole or in part by the Indonesian military span the full range of the economy, from agribusiness to manufacturing and from golf courses to banks. In September 2005 the TNI complied with a request from the Ministry of Defense for an inventory of its business interests.[1] (Preparation of the inventory was a first step toward implementing the TNI law passed a year earlier that mandated the transfer of these businesses to government control.) The initial inventory identified 219 military entities (foundations, cooperatives, and foundation companies) engaged in business activity.[2]
As of March 2006, the TNI had provided information on 1,520 individual TNI business units.[3]
(See Data 1, below.) By April 2006, the Ministry of Defense had initiated a separate review process to examine whether its three foundations were engaged in business activity.[4]

Data 1: Inventory of Military Businesses

Initial Inventory (September 2005)
Foundations 25
Companies under Foundations 89
Cooperative Units Engaged in Business 105

Revised Inventory (March 2006)
Total Individual Business Units 1520

Source: Ministry of Defense letter to Human Rights Watch, December 22, 2005; Maj. Gen. Suganda, then TNI spokesman, “TNI commits to reform[,] upholds supremacy of law,” opinion-editorial, Jakarta Post, March 15, 2006.

The TNI and other authorities who have access to the inventory results have not publicly identified the  individual business interests held by the military or provided information on their total value. Officials involved in the review of the military’s businesses declined to share a copy of the inventory with Human Rights Watch, to provide the names of the businesses listed on it, or to reveal the businesses’ total declared value.[5 ]
They said the data supplied by the TNI could not be considered final because it was “very rough” and  included many entities that, in their view, did not constitute “real businesses.”[6]
According to these officials, the list incorporated many small-scale ventures, some with assets of negligible value, alongside other, much larger enterprises.[7]

In the meantime, public statements offer some indications. In mid-2005, unnamed officials told the   Singapore-based Straits Times newspaper that the top twenty or so military companies in Indonesia had a total estimated annual income of $200 million.[8]
For the sake of comparison, perhaps the best available historical figure is one used by foreign finance officials. An “informal review” of a selection of eighty-eight military businesses in Indonesia found that they had a  combined turnover of Rp. 2.9 trillion ($348 million) in 1998/1999.[9] The Far Eastern Economic Review, referring to the same study, further revealed that annual revenue from the selected military businesses  amounted to approximately Rp. 500 billion ($60 million).[10] Contrasting this to the $200 million figure  offered in mid-2005 (which covered a smaller number of companies), it appears that those military businesses that survived the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s were able to rebound significantly from that low point. (See below for additional data specifically for businesses held under military foundations.)

Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Illustrative Diagram of a Military Business
Click Here for large diagram


Note: This example is provided here to demonstrate the ownership structure of military businesses and does not purport to make a substantive claim about the businesses listed. It is based on information provided by TNI headquarters and supplemented by two people familiar with the navy’s businesses because they reviewed them (in one case, as part of an internal review by the navy and in the other independently). (Information as of May 2006.)
    
    Link:
Bila ABRI berbisnis: menyingkap data dan kasus penyimpangan dalam praktik bisnis kalangan militerBila ABRI berbisnis: Praktek Bisnis militer
Bisnis militer Orde Baru: Keterlibatan ABRI dalam bidang ekonomi dan pengaruhnya dalam rezim otoriterBisnis militer Orde Baru
Australian Defence Business Review
The Indonesian Military After the New OrderSuharto the smiling generals
Power Politics and the Indonesian MilitaryPower Politics and the Indonesian Military Suharto the smiling generals 


Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military


HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 18, NO. 5(C)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] In the Indonesian language, the defense ministry is called the Department of Defense but it is in English as
usually referred to as the Ministry of Defense.
[2] By comparison, according to a 2001 estimate provided by Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, who
served a first term as defense minister from 1999 to 2000, the military then owned some 250 companies. ICG, “Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform,” ICG Asia Report, no. 24, October 11, 2001, p. 13. It is reasonable to assume that the 2001 figure reflected the outcome of an effort Sudarsono announced a year earlier, in which the defense ministry was “cooperating with the TNI headquarters to find out the number of foundations, cooperative units or companies owned by the TNI.” “Indonesian minister warns…,” AFP.
[3] Major General Suganda, “TNI commits to reform…,” Jakarta Post.
[4] Human Rights Watch interview with a person involved in that review, Jakarta, April 18, 2006.
[5] Human Rights Watch interview with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense and former TNI spokesman, Jakarta, April 12, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Said Didu (commonly known as Said Didu, the name used hereafter in this report), secretary of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, Jakarta, April 19, 2006.
[6] The question of how the government would define military business for the purpose of implementing the TNI law’s mandate that these businesses be transferred to government control is discussed further below (see the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform”). Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Said Didu, April 2006.
[7] Ibid.
[8] John McBeth, “Tough job to wind up Armed Forces Inc,” Straits Times, June 4, 2005. The remaining formallyestablished military businesses were considered not to be economically viable. Ibid. Elsewhere, the total value of the military’s business holdings has been estimated, variously, at Rp. 326 billion (more than $35 million), Rp. 10 trillion ($1.06 billion), and more than $8 billion, to offer but a few examples. In most cases, it was unclear how these figures were calculated.
[9] The data was cited in a report prepared for international donors. World Bank, Accelerating Recovery in
Uncertain Times: Brief for the Consultative Group on Indonesia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), p. 29.
[10] John McBeth, “The Army’s Dirty Business,” FEER, November 7, 2002. The article, presumably using 2002 exchange rates, gave the dollar equivalent as $55.5 million.

Book review:
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences at the Turn of the Millennium (Adelphi series)
Military Reform and Democratisation
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983
Indonesian Military Politics
Our Kind of Guys: The United States and the Indonesian Military
The United States and the Indonesian Military
 
READ MORE - Indonesian Military Business

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Early Indonesian Military Businesses

Indonesian Military Businesses
 I. An Overview of Indonesian Military business
A Brief History of Military Economic Activity
The Indonesian military’s involvement in economic activity in Indonesia dates back to the 1945-1949 Indonesian war for independence from the Netherlands. The nascent military was responsible for raising its own funds. In addition to relying on popular backing and material support, in some areas military units turned to smuggling to finance
their operations.

The pattern of self-financing continued after the formation of the Indonesian armed forces (which became known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI, a combined military-police structure until 1999). Official budget allocations to the military were low. As a consequence, throughout the 1950s military commands and units continued to raise their own funds to a large degree. Their fundraising methods went beyond illegal activities such as organized smuggling and illegal levies: Increasingly, military commanders also allied themselves with local businesspeople to generate funds to cover military expenditures. In some cases the military command itself would be granted a stake in a business venture managed by a private partner.
3

Early Military Businesses
The military began to take part in large-scale businesses by the latter part of the 1950s. In the late 1950s, under martial law, the military took over control of Dutch companies. Soon afterwards President Sukarno formally placed the newly nationalized companies under the supervision of senior military personnel. The state takeover of British companies and some United States ones followed in the mid-1960s. Control of these
enterprises was likewise granted to military officers. In part, these moves responded to severe budget shortfalls that resulted in paltry salaries, poor housing, and insufficient clothing and equipment for soldiers.
4

The military also became heavily involved in managing major state-owned enterprises. Oil giant Pertamina and the logistics agency Badan Urusan Logistik (or Bulog) were both dominated by military leadership throughout the 1960s and into the next decade. Profits from military-run companies were commonly directed to the military.
5

This “unconventional financing,” moreover, allowed the government and military leadership to give the appearance of sacrificing military spending in favor of other national priorities.
6

The rapid expansion of the military’s economic engagement in the 1960s extended to the private sector. Much of the growth was from military partnerships with private businesspeople. It was the private entrepreneurs who in fact operated most military-sponsored businesses. The military’s actual contribution to its business ventures typically was nominal: military partners provided licenses and approvals, and helped secure concessions and state contracts.
7

The Situation Today
The September 2004 law mandating that the Indonesian military end its involvement in business was a watershed initiative, but one that left many questions unanswered. The language of the law is subject to multiple interpretations, and the provisions have not yet been enforced. Some preliminary steps have been taken but these have been slow and insufficient: the promise of the law remains untested. A more detailed critique is given below in the chapter on “Obstacles to Reform.” It finds that those in a position to make change happen have not shown a commitment to addressing the full costs of military self-finance, including in human rights terms. To the contrary, they have defined military business narrowly, focusing only on select elements of what is a much deeper structural problem, they have provided a number of exemptions that would leave vast parts of the military’s commercial structure in place, and they have not pursued real accountability. 

  Link:
Human Rights Watch Indonesia the ViolenceHuman Rights Watch Indonesia the Violence
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military.
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983.
Military Reform and Democratisation: Turkish and Indonesian Experiences (Adelphi series).
Indonesian, US militaries join forces to deploy cargo to Lebanon.(GOVERNMENT NEWS*): An article from: Defense Transportation Journal.
U.S. seeks closer ties with Indonesian military; Wolfowitz visited Indonesia for military reasons, not tsunami relief.(Viewpoint): An article from: National Catholic Reporter.
The Indonesian military business complex: Origins, course and future (Working paper / Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University)




Article Table of Contents
Security services for freeport Indonesia
Some illegal business activities by Military
 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 18, NO. 5(C)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3] Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 250-252, 259-260.
4] Lesley McCulloch, “Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business,” in The Military as an Economic
Actor, Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes , eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 101.
5] Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 275-285; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, p. 252; Danang Widoyoko, Irfan Muktiono, Adnan Topan Husodo, Barly Haliem N, and Agung Wijay, Bisnis Milter Mencari Legitimasi (Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy), (Jakarta: Indonesia Corruption Watch and National Democratic Institute, 2003), pp. vi, 27-33. A translation in English is available. See Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, [online]
http://www.indonesia-house.org/dbindhouse/bm/Icw_bis_mil/Daftar_Isi.htm. References in this report, including page citations, refer to the original text rather than the translation.
6] Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 274, 277.
7] Ibid., p. 284; Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, pp. 252, 268; Widoyoko et al., Military Businesses in Search of Legitimacy, p. 28. 


Book's review:
"Unkept Promise": Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia
Failure to End Military Business Activity
 
Military & Democracy Indonesia
Military & Democracy Indonesia
The Indonesian Economy since 1966: Southeast Asia's Emerging Giant
The Indonesian Economy since 1966





READ MORE - Early Indonesian Military Businesses

Friday, March 13, 2009

F-16 Project from U.S Arms to Soeharto

The Pending F-16 Sale

A pending sale of F-16s to Indonesia was postponed in mid-1996 due to a new wave of repression by the Suharto regime against the Indonesian pro-democracy movement. Allegations of improper influence involving Indonesian contributions to the Democratic Party have resulted in further delays in the timing of the sale, but the Clinton administration appears to be committed to moving forward on the deal some time later this year. The F-16s being offered are leftover from a deal with Pakistan that was interrupted due to sanctions on that nation for its nuclear weapons program. Funds from the Indonesia sale will be used to partially reimburse Pakistan for the cost of the 28 planes it purchased but never received. Lockheed Martin may only stand to make a few million dollars doing "upgrades" on the planes, but their real interest is in opening the door for additional F-16 sales to Indonesia and other parts of Asia. Indonesia has already expressed a strong interest in purchasing the latest-model F-16 fighter planes in the next go around.

Current plans call for the Clinton Administration to formally notify Congress about the Indonesian F-16 sale some time later this year, probably at some decent interval after the Senate hearings on the financing of the 1996 presidential elections have been concluded. The sale will face strong opposition. Prominent Senators such as Patrick Leahy (D-VT) have already written to the President to express their opposition to the deal, and key House members ranging from Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) have also weighed in against it. In a November 10, 1996 letter to the Washington Post, Rep.

Gilman revealed that he had informed Clinton Administration representatives in the summer of 1996 that if they went forward with the proposed F-16 sale in the face of the Suharto regime's crackdown on opposition political leaders that he would "introduce a resolution of disapproval and convene an early meeting of our full committee for the purpose of reporting my resolution to the full house." Gilman further noted that in the light of the revelations regarding the Lippo Group and Indonesian money in the 1996 elections, "I have requested the Secretary of State to withhold action on this proposal until the many questions now raised by the Lippo Group investigation can be resolved."

Major non-governmental organizations that have already taken a stand against the sale include the National Council of Churches, Human Rights Watch, the Federation of American Scientists, Peace Action (the largest grassroots peace organization in the United States), and the East Timor Action Network. Possible Congressional actions could range from resolutions of disapproval blocking the deal outright to amendments conditioning the sale of any further weaponry to Indonesia on the improvement of human rights and democratic process in Indonesia and East Timor.

The Clinton Administration's various rationales for going ahead with the sale are contradictory at best. In the context of defending himself against charges of influence peddling in the matter of Indonesian contributions to his campaign, President Clinton has made a point of arguing that he has been harder on Indonesia than the Bush Administration was, citing a ban that the State Department has imposed on the sale of small arms from the U.S. to Indonesia as evidence of his tough stand. Selling F-16 fighters, but not handguns or rifles, sends the Suharto regime a mixed message at best regarding the consequences of its ongoing record of repression and human rights abuses.

At an October 11 briefing, White House spokesperson Mike McCurry tried to carve out an exception for the F-16 sale, asserting that "our goal in arms transfers in that region is to promote stability . . . not to engage in anything resembling the repression of individual rights . . . You don't use F-16s to kill civilians in crackdowns on dissidents." During Congressional testimony in September, Assistant Defense Secretary Kurt Campbell sounded the "stability, not repression" theme as well when he argued for the Indonesian F-16 sale on the grounds that "a regionally respected armed forces with credible defensive capabilities that trains and operates in a non-threatening manner is an important contributor to regional stability."

All of these arguments overlook the fact that the Indonesian military has been the instrument for Jakarta's illegal occupation of East Timor, during which time over 200,000 people have been killed. Selling advanced weaponry to the Suharto regime at the very moment that it is engaged in a crackdown on dissent within Indonesia and an acceleration of repression in East Timor sends exactly the wrong message: that whatever abuses it may engage in, and whatever slaps on the wrist it may receive from the Clinton Administration as a result, when push comes to shove the U.S. will support the Suharto regime and its military apparatus regardless of its brutal, lawless behavior. Furthermore, while F-16s may not be used directly to put down street demonstration or torture human rights activists, the Indonesian military's ability to sustain its illegal hold over East Timor ultimately rests on all of the weaponry it has at its disposal (including tanks and advanced combat aircraft like the F-16), not just the items used in day-to-day repression.

Related under articles: U.S Arms transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?


Link On:


Book's review: 
The 2009 Import and Export Market for Non-Military Arms in Asia
Import and Export Market in Asia
 

Suharto: A Political Biography
Failure to End Military Business Activity
Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978-98 (Studies on Contemporary China)
The Rise and Fall of Chinese Military Business

READ MORE - F-16 Project from U.S Arms to Soeharto

Soeharto and U.S Arms

How Important Are U.S. Arms for Soeharto Regime
Soeharto regime and U.S

During the 1977 House International Relations Committee hearing, George H. Aldrich, the State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor, testified that "roughly 90%" of Indonesia's weapons during the time of the 1975 invasion of East Timor came from the United States. As one high-ranking Indonesian general bluntly pointed out, "Of course there were US weapons used [during the attack on East Timor]. These are the only weapons that we have."

During Indonesia's prolonged battle to occupy the island of East Timor, US-supplied counterinsurgency aircraft also proved essential. Certainly one of the deadliest weapons in Indonesia's arsenal was the US-supplied OV-10 Bronco, especially designed for close-combat, which is equipped with infared detectors, and can carry up to 3600 pounds of ordnance, grenade launchers, rockets, napalm, and machine guns.  In the late 1970s, Indonesia used OV-10 Broncos and other US-supplied equipment to carry out extensive and continuous bombing missions in the interior highlands, eradicating crops and forcing 300,000 East Timorese to flee to the Indonesian-controlled lowlands. From there, refugees were herded into concentration camps, where thousands died of starvation and disease.

Although Jakarta has diversified its weapons sources since that time, turning to Britain, France, Germany and others to round out its arsenal, U.S. supplies remain essential. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1992 to 1994 (the most recent years for which full data is available), Indonesia received 53% of its weapons imports from the United States. Since the mid-1980s, Indonesia has relied almost entirely on the United States and its Western European allies (particularly the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) for its imported armaments, obtaining anywhere from 91 to 100% of its imported weapons from U.S. or Western European sources over this time period.

Major deals with European powers have included imports of 20 105mm howitzers from France, several squadrons of Hawk fighter jets from the United Kingdom, and dozens of combat ships from Germany (equipment that belonged to the former East German navy).This concentration of imports from the U.S. and its key European allies suggest that a coordinated policy among these nations to limit arms to Indonesia in exchange for improvements in human rights and withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor could have a considerable impact in shaping Indonesian policy. With a handful of close allies supplying most of Indonesia's weaponry, the old argument that "if we don't sell it, somebody else will" rings particularly hollow.

Table II provides data on the major sources of arms to Indonesia from 1978 through 1994, based on data from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (see p. 10, below). Because Indonesia has accumulated so much U.S. weaponry in the past two decades, there is also a brisk trade in spare parts and upgrades for U.S. systems that are already in Jakarta's arsenal. According to data supplied by the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), in Fiscal Year 1994 U.S. companies received 198 licenses for the export of $88.3 million worth of weapons and weapons components to Indonesia; in F.Y. 1995, the Department granted 248 licenses for items worth more than $221 million.

The majority of these licenses will not result in final sales; historically only about one-sixth to one-third of the value of licenses granted to a given country result in actual sales. Nevertheless, even if $50 to $100 million of the $309 million in licenses approved during 1994 and 1995 result in transfers of arms and arms technology to Indonesia, that will represent a significant boost to the Indonesian military. Among the items licensed are millions of dollars in spare parts for Indonesia's U.S.-origin A-4, F-5, F-16, and C-130 aircraft; spare parts for armored combat vehicles and Sidewinder missiles; and small licenses for spare night vision scopes for U.S. made rifles, pistols and revolvers, and ammunition manufacturing.
Table II: Major Arms Suppliers to Indonesia
1978-1994
Years Total Arms Imports Top Suppliers (by %)
1992-1994 $170 million U.S. 53%
Germany 47%
Total, Top 2: 100%
1991-1993 $210 million France 47%
U.S. 33%
Germany 19%
Total, Top 3: 99%
1987-1991 $950 million U.S. 37%
France 14%
Other Western European 45%
Total from U.S./Western Europe: 96%
1985-1989 $770 million U.S. 26%
United Kingdom 10%
Other Western European 55%
Total from U.S./Western Europe: 91%
1984-1988 $715 million U.S. 29%
United Kingdom 15%
Total, Top 2: 44%
1982-1986 $750 million U.S. 25%
U.K. 13%
France 13%
Total, Top 3: 51%
1979-1983 $1,360 million U.S. 20%
France 15%
U.K. 7%
Total, Top 3: 42%
1978-1982 $1,300 million U.S. 19%
Germany 11%
France 9%
Total, Top 3: 39%
Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, editions covering, 1993-94, 1991-92, 1990, 1989, 1987, 1985, and 1972-82. Corporate Culprits
Among the U.S. corporations that are profiting from arms sales to Indonesia are Lockheed Martin (maker of the F-16 and the C-130 transport, both of which have been shipped to Indonesia); Textron (whose Cadillac Gage and Bell Helicopter divisions have supplied armored vehicles and military helicopters to the Jakarta regime); Colt Industries (which has sold thousands of M-16 rifles to the Indonesian armed forces); and General Motors/Hughes (which has sold 500MD helicopters to Jakarta as well as air-to-air missiles)
Related under articles: U.S Arms transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?


Link on:



Book's review:

Human Rights, Politics and Corruption in Indonesia: A Critical Reflection on the Post Soeharto Era
Human Rights, Politics and Corruption in Indonesia
Indonesia in the Soeharto Years: Issues, Incidents and Images
Indonesia in the Soeharto Years

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