"No Body Knows behind The Fact of Rebellion in Indonesia, We Only know that rebellion is worst. So who is the most benefit from that rebellion? You'll never predict it before. Open Ur mind 'n eyes."Indonesian Military and U.S. Business: A Winning Combination?
Reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and a growing consensus within the Bush administration all view the military as central to Indonesia’s stability, especially in the strife ridden provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. But the characterization of the military as a stabilizing force ignores the military’s strong incentives for prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Aceh and Irian Jaya.
In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch, a researcher for the Bonn International Center for Conversion, describes the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. As much as 80% of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution and illegal casinos and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan.[73]
Former Defense Minister Juwono conceded in an interview with McCulloch that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence," leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million.[74] In Aceh, soldiers sell their weapons to the guerillas for as little as $6, ensuring their enemies remain a potent force.[75] Many soldiers and officials go so far as to refer to the Aceh fight as a "project," highlighting the role the war plays in filling their pockets, winning them promotions and keeping the institution as a whole powerful and relevant.[76]
While this is a winning combination for the Indonesian military and multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport, not to mention a vital market for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the people who live and work in the areas "protected" by the Indonesian military gain nothing but more suffering. Until this dynamic can be fully outlined and understood, arguments for arming the Indonesian military in order to ensure stability and end conflict must not be taken at face value.
Related Under this articles: A Stabilizing force by military in Indonesia
Source:Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001
Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy."
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense
Link on:
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia-US Military Alliance Is Being Revived; Jakarta Mulls Leaving OPEC.: An article from: APS Diplomat News Service
Disarming politics: if Aceh's military is to leave politics to the people, Indonesia's must as well.(INDONESIA): An article from: New Internationalist
United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years
The Forces Postal Service in Borneo During the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966
Economic Crisis and Vulnerability: The Story from Southeast Asia
Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State (The Ethnography of Political Violence)
Book's review:
 |
| Indonesia's Use of Military Force |
 |
| Out of Business and on Budget |
 |
| Indonesia's War over Aceh |
 |
| Security Operations in Aceh |
