Friday, March 13, 2009

The fact of Conflicts on Poso



Conflicts on Poso, Central Sulawesi-Indonesia

Maybe, The National Intelligence Agency (BIN) has to take apart with this condition or they already know the main problem then they only see and take it easy with the conditions. (Indonesia, The land which full of intrigue and conspiracy. We have to change this condition)

Most of the sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi, both during the Moluccan conflict and at the present time, has been concentrated on the coastal town of Poso and its surrounding district. What marks Central Sulawesi as special is that it is more or less divided equally between Muslims and Christians. On Poso, there is an imbalance weighted in favor of Muslims. Muslims number 44.99% of the total population in Poso regency, Christians are 39.10%, Catholics 2.5% while the rest are Hindu and Buddhist.

The protagonists of violence on Poso were not only members of Lashkar Jihad, according to The International Crisis Group's Asia Report No 43 of December 11, 2002 (full pdf document can be obtained from HERE, with registration required).

The terror group Jemaah Islamiyah was behind some of the Islamic militia groups active on Poso. These had names such as Laskar Jundullah (army of Allah). There were several groups of this name, but one was formed in September 2000 as the military wing of KPPSI, the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law. This was headed by Agus Dwikarna, later imprisoned as a JI member in the Philippines. Though officially based in Makasar, it had its military headquarters at Poso. It recruited members of another Islamic 'army", Laskar Mujahidin, and also the group Darul Islam.


Darul Islam, founded in the 1940s with the aim of establishing a Caliphate in southeast Asia, had provided Jemaah Islamiyah with many of its core members. From 1953 to 1962, Darul Islam launched a rebellion on Aceh in northwestern Indonesia. It also had rebellions in West Java and South Sulawesi in the 1950s. It still exists, and a cell on West Java has links with Noordin Top, the JI financier and recruiter.

Link on: 
Darul-Islam: Kartosuwirjos Kampf um einen islamischen Staat Indonesien (Beitrage zur Sudasienforschung) (German Edition) 
Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior 
Gerakan Islam tradisional di Malaysia: Jamat Tabligh & Darul Arqum 
Islam in Indonesia: A survey of events and developments from 1988 to March 1993 (Seri INIS) 
M. Natsir dan Darul Islam: Studi kasus Aceh dan Sulawesi Selatan tahun 1953-1958

JI was founded in Malaysia around 1995 by Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar in the 1970s also founded the Pondok Ngruki (also called Al Mukmin), the Islamic pesantren in Solo, about 250 miles east of Jakarta. He had co-founded this school with the "spiritual leader" of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir. About 30 known or suspected Islamic terrorists have attended this pesantren.

Bashir was arrested and jailed for "giving his consent" to the 2002 Bali bombings. Currently there are three conspirators involved in the 2003 bombings, who are awaiting imminent execution. One of these, Amrozi, had attended the Pondok Ngruki school, led by Bashir, and said that it was a "JI institution". Another of those awaiting death by firing squad is Imam Samudra. The Laskar Mujahidin was linked to the Ngruki school and the MMI, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which had been founded by Bashir and others in August 2000.

According to the International Crisis Group, Samudra was directly involved with recruiting for the "jihad" on Poso and the Moluccas.

From his base in a training camp in Cimalati, Pandeglang regency in Banten province (West Java), Samudra would send JI operatives who were to recruit people for jihadist operations in Poso and Ambon. These would approach students, and would invite them to meetings, where they would be shown video CDs of the wars in Ambon and Poso. These videos would be produced by Mujahideen KOMPAK, an affiliate of JI, and would document atrocities supposedly carried out by Christians. After this, there followed about four months of study and discussion about the impending darkness that would come unless they fought for jihad. When the recruits were considered ready, they would be sent to fight in Poso and Ambon.

Other groups involved in the fighting on Poso included Adnan Arsal's Komite Perjuangan Muslim Poso ( KPMP). By the time Lashkar Jihad disbanded in early October, 2002, it had chased out the fighters of the smaller group Laskar Mujahidin from Poso.

Link on:  
Tafsir - Ul - Qur'an, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur'an, 4 Vols. 
Kebangkitan Islam Di kalangan pelajar
The Message of Al-Quran

The initial trigger for the violence in Poso and the Moluccas began in 1998, when the dictator Haji Mohamed Suharto was finally forced to resign in 1998. During his rule of twenty-one years' duration, he had forcefully suppressed Islamist groups in Indonesia. Under his rule, the tradition on Poso was to have the regional governor or bupati alternate from a Muslim, then to a Christian and back, to keep some sense of impartiality and equilibrium. In 1998, the Muslim bupati, Arief Patanga, announced that his successor was to be a member of his family, rather than a Christian, breaking the tradition.

In the Christmas period of 1998, a minor fight broke out in Poso, outside a small mosque. As a result, Poso erupted into violence. The city was left a smoldering wreck as a result of the first conflict (below).
The fighting which took place led to churches being burned, such as the Oikumene Iradat Puri Church in Palu. The Reverend Irianto Kongkoli, who was shot dead on October 16, placed the blame for the Poso violence on the regent or bupati, Arief Patanga, who officially held his post from 1992 to 1997. As we noted earlier, he said: "The one who should be severely punished is Arief Patanga. "Christian homes and churches continued to be destroyed sporadically until April 2000 when the Muslim on Christian violence reached another peak. Then, there was mounted a retaliation.

A group called the Black Bat was involved in the Christian attacks, as was another called the Red Group. As jihadists had either voluntarily come to Poso to engage in the violence or had been sent by JI and Lashkar Jihad, an influx of Christians had also come to take part in the reprisals.

Among the individuals who had come to Poso in April-May to join the counter-attack against Muslims were Christians from East Nusa Tenggara province, which lies south of Sulawesi island. Three individuals who came to Poso at this time were Catholics, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu.
Their alleged involvement, and their subsequent fate, are instrumental in understanding some of the excesses of the Poso conflicts from the time of the Moluccan war, and also in understanding the violence which is currently engulfing Poso.

 Link On:
De Oorsprong van de Priestertaal in Poso
Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia
Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia (Nijmegen Studies in Development and Cultural Change (NICCOS))
Between Cross and Crescent: Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Malcolm and Martin (History of African-American Religions)
Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950. Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jansen. Second Revised Edition. ... Encounter 7) (Currents of Encounter Series)

The three men are said to have gone into an area where violence was raging to evacuate children from a church-led school in the village of Moengko, Poso City. A Muslim mob came to the church on May 23, 2000 and burned the church down. The children and the three men escaped before the building was razed.
These three men were, however, accused of inciting murders of Muslims, and orchestrating the violence which happened in the phase of the conflict during May 2000.

The Christian on Muslim violence was as horrific as anything mounted by the Muslims. In one village, Sintuwulemba, an estimated 300 Muslims were massacred. Their bodies were thrown in the Poso river, where they floated out to sea.

A peace accord was signed in August 2000, and though the conflict did not cease, it subsided substantially. However, in April 2001, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu were sentenced to death in a court case that was marked by crowds of Muslims calling for their death. It has been argued that the three men received an unfair trial, and that the judges ordered their deaths to appease the baying Muslim mob surrounding the Palu courthouse.

The death sentence caused a resurgence of the conflict, and in August 2001, Lashkar Jihad arrived in force to wage their war, burning Christian villages around Poso. Other Islamist groups had already been operating for some time by then. Many of the Christians took refuge in the highland lakeside town of Tentena, which is predominantly Christian.

The government intervened and the Malino Accord was brokered in December of that year. In January and February large stockpiles of weapons grew as fighters surrendered them to provincial authorities, but soon, the terms of the Accord were being breached by both sides. The Christians of the region were now without weapons, even though killings of Christians continued.

One individual who had signed the Malino Accord in December 2001 became a victim of its "justice" in August 2002. In mid August, two Muslim attacks took place upon villages near Poso. Three Christians were killed in Peleru, and Mayumba came under siege shortly after. Reverend Rinaldy Damanik, the head of the Protestant Church in the Central Sulawesi region, had helped to evacuate Christians from both villages. He was arrested on August 17 as his lorry was being besieged by jihadists. Police arrested him, and claimed that he was transporting 14 rifles and explosives. Under the terms of Malino, trafficking in weapons carried a sentence of either 12 years' jail or death by firing squad.

While in prison in Palu, awaiting trial, an attempt was made to poison Rev. Damanik on December 26, 2002, the fourth anniversary of the start of the Poso conflict. He was hospitalized as a result. He was placed on trial on February 3, 2003 and on 16 June, 2003, he was given a three year jail term. He was finally released in November 2004.

The main conflict only came to end in October 2002, when Lashkar Jihad announced that its main fighting wing in Poso, the Zabir, would leave the region of conflict. It was at this time that Laskar Jihad was voluntarily dissolving itself. It has been suggested that this had happened because Jafar Umar Thalib, who had been arrested in April 2002 for a speech made at Ambon mosque, in which he threatened not only Christians, but the government, was awaiting his trial. It was suggested that the group dissolved itself as a measure to stop Thalib becoming jailed. Whether the group is really inactive, or merely dormant, is not so clear.
Source: http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003258.html

Link:
Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: National Case Studies

Book's review:

Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
 
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
READ MORE - The fact of Conflicts on Poso

Indonesian Military and U.S. Business

"No Body Knows behind The Fact of Rebellion in Indonesia, We Only know that rebellion is  worst. So who is the most benefit from that rebellion? You'll never predict it before. Open Ur mind 'n eyes."


Indonesian Military and U.S. Business: A Winning Combination?

Reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and a growing consensus within the Bush administration all view the military as central to Indonesia’s stability, especially in the strife ridden provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. But the characterization of the military as a stabilizing force ignores the military’s strong incentives for prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Aceh and Irian Jaya. 


In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch, a researcher for the Bonn International Center for Conversion, describes the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. As much as 80% of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution and illegal casinos and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan.[73] 


Former Defense Minister Juwono conceded in an interview with McCulloch that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence," leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million.[74] In Aceh, soldiers sell their weapons to the guerillas for as little as $6, ensuring their enemies remain a potent force.[75] Many soldiers and officials go so far as to refer to the Aceh fight as a "project," highlighting the role the war plays in filling their pockets, winning them promotions and keeping the institution as a whole powerful and relevant.[76] 


While this is a winning combination for the Indonesian military and multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport, not to mention a vital market for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the people who live and work in the areas "protected" by the Indonesian military gain nothing but more suffering. Until this dynamic can be fully outlined and understood, arguments for arming the Indonesian military in order to ensure stability and end conflict must not be taken at face value.


Related Under this articles: A Stabilizing force by military in Indonesia
 Source:Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001

Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy." 
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense


Link on:
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia-US Military Alliance Is Being Revived; Jakarta Mulls Leaving OPEC.: An article from: APS Diplomat News Service
Disarming politics: if Aceh's military is to leave politics to the people, Indonesia's must as well.(INDONESIA): An article from: New Internationalist


United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years
The Forces Postal Service in Borneo During the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966
Economic Crisis and Vulnerability: The Story from Southeast Asia
Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State (The Ethnography of Political Violence)



Book's review:
Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force (Books and Monographs)
Indonesia's Use of Military Force
Out of Business and on Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia
Out of Business and on Budget

Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia's War over Aceh
Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons
Security Operations in Aceh
 
READ MORE - Indonesian Military and U.S. Business

A Stabilizing Force By Military in Indonesia

Indonesian Military: A Stabilizing Force for Whom?

The most salient arguments for the resumption of military aid are made on behalf of Aceh and Irian Jaya. In these beleaguered provinces separatist movements, recently reinvigorated by East Timor’s hard-won success, have been struggling for decades.

Perhaps that is the reason why Indonesia has many struggle which want own autonomy for their region, control their region by theirself without any force from central government because they think that Central Government not fair for allocate the annual budget to the local region. Bad diplomatic policy in the International court make Indonesia territory become disappear one by one, Indonesia Diplomat can't make a good deal to keeping the Indonesia territory. This situation also worsened by military operations that hedge human rights in the disputes regional. Conflict between local people and military made the situation more complicated.


The Fact in Aceh:

This oil-rich western province is located at the head of the Malacca strait that links the Pacific and Indian oceans-- one of the most strategic waterways in the world. While most Americans would be hard pressed to find Aceh on a map, its oil wealth is key to Jakarta’s power and extremely valuable for U.S. corporations. The New York Times acknowledged Aceh’s centrality when it noted that the province of 4.1 million people, "is far more important to Indonesia’s future and that of South East Asia than East Timor ever was." Aceh’s oil and other commodities contribute 20% of Indonesia’s annual budget, but only 1% is reinvested into the province.

In the late 1980s, in response to the burgeoning movement for independence, Jakarta declared the province a "Military Operations Area" (known by its Indonesian acronym DOM). During the DOM era, thousands of Acehnese civilians were killed, raped, tortured, and abducted. The DOM was lifted in August 1998, but the violence continues. During two days in November 2000, more than a hundred unarmed Acehnese civilians attending a rally were shot dead by security forces. Last year at least one thousand people, mostly civilians and separatists guerrillas, were killed—three times the number killed in 1999. The death toll for this year has already exceeded 1,100.

For the most part, the war in Aceh has taken place beneath the radar screen of Western media and politics. But two brutal incidents in late 2000 brought the plight the Acehnese and the role of U.S. weapons to the front pages of American newspapers. Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a prominent Acehnese lawyer with permanent residence in the U.S., was working for human rights and a peaceful resolution to the conflict when he was disappeared, tortured and murdered. His body was found in September 2000 along with four other unidentified bodies in an area that the military frequently uses to dispose of bodies. A few months later, "military death squads" killed three Acehnese working for a Danish aid group. A survivor of the attack was able to give his testimony to Human Rights Watch before going into hiding. He reported that the leader "carried a machine gun, I think it was an M-16, and had an FN pistol on his waist. Another one had a machine gun with a grenade launcher attached. The commander…had a pistol and an automatic rifle, most of the others also carried rifles."

From the U.S. perspective, Aceh is important as a location for U.S.-owned oil companies, but their presence has not encouraged respect for human rights. ExxonMobil, the largest publicly held corporation in the United States, has a huge oil and gas operation in Aceh. The company was sued in June by International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of eleven Acehnese who lived and worked near ExxonMobil’s operations. The villagers contend that they and their families have been the victims of murder, torture, kidnapping and rape at the hands of Indonesian military units guarding ExxonMobil’s gas fields. The suit, filed in Washington, DC, charges that the company provided the Indonesian military with logistical and material support, including:

• Buildings used by the Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) units to "interrogate, torture and murder Acehnese civilians."
• Heavy equipment like excavators used by the military to dig mass graves.
• Access to ExxonMobil constructed roads to transport victims to mass grave sites.

This collaboration demonstrates the two party’s mutual goal of maintaining Indonesian control of the province. The IFRF suit claims that the ExxonMobil fears that the "creation of an independent state for the people of Aceh as the result of a democratic uprising" would nullify their "business arrangement with the Indonesian government." Until March 2000, when ExxonMobil suspended operations after a spate of attacks on their pipeline, Jakarta received an estimated $100 million in revenue from the company every month. In an effort to ensure their revenue stream and reassure ExxonMobil, Jakarta sent three additional battalions of troops and an armored calvary unit to beef up security in the region. ExxonMobil resumed limited production a few months later.

Related under this Articles: Indonesia Military and U.S business

Source: Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001

Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy."
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense



Link on:
Masters of terror: Indonesia's military & violence in East Timor in 1999 (Canberra papers on strategy & defence) 
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia) 
Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966 (Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948-1975) 


Book's review:

Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor (World Social Change)
Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor
Security, Development and Nation-Building in Timor-Leste: A Cross-sectoral Assessment (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Security, and Development in Timor Leste

Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture
Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial, and Justice in Cambodia and East Timor
Timor Leste: Politics, History, and Culture

READ MORE - A Stabilizing Force By Military in Indonesia

Who Will Pick Up the Tab?

Financing and Offsets: Who will pick up the tab?

Indonesia received its last major installment of military aid from the United States in 1991, when the U.S. supplied the Suharto regime with $25 million under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Since that time, however, Indonesia has become eligible for several new channels of arms export subsidies, one of which it has taken advantage of already and the other of which coule come into play as part of the pending F-16 sale. The first channel involves guaranteed loans offered by the U.S. government's Export-Import Bank which are granted for so-called "dual use" items: equipment with both military and civilian applications. Indonesia was one of the first countries to benefit from this new program, which was implemented after intensive lobbying by the Aerospace Industries Association. In late 1995 Indonesia received a $22 million loan guarantee from ExIm Bank to refurbish seven of that nation's U.S.-origin C-130 and L-100 transport aircraft. The second channel of assistance is the Pentagon's newly created $15 billion arms export loan guarantee fund: [13] Indonesia is one of 37 nations in Europe and Asia that is currently eligible to receive support from the fund. Indonesian officials have indicated an interest in receiving some kind of credit or subsidized financing for the F-16 sale. If so, Indonesia would receive very cushy financing: any missed payments on the roughly $200 million involved in the F-16 sale and the shortfall would be fully covered by U.S. taxpayers. [14]

Related under articles: U.S Arms transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?
READ MORE - Who Will Pick Up the Tab?

F-16 Project from U.S Arms to Soeharto

The Pending F-16 Sale

A pending sale of F-16s to Indonesia was postponed in mid-1996 due to a new wave of repression by the Suharto regime against the Indonesian pro-democracy movement. Allegations of improper influence involving Indonesian contributions to the Democratic Party have resulted in further delays in the timing of the sale, but the Clinton administration appears to be committed to moving forward on the deal some time later this year. The F-16s being offered are leftover from a deal with Pakistan that was interrupted due to sanctions on that nation for its nuclear weapons program. Funds from the Indonesia sale will be used to partially reimburse Pakistan for the cost of the 28 planes it purchased but never received. Lockheed Martin may only stand to make a few million dollars doing "upgrades" on the planes, but their real interest is in opening the door for additional F-16 sales to Indonesia and other parts of Asia. Indonesia has already expressed a strong interest in purchasing the latest-model F-16 fighter planes in the next go around.

Current plans call for the Clinton Administration to formally notify Congress about the Indonesian F-16 sale some time later this year, probably at some decent interval after the Senate hearings on the financing of the 1996 presidential elections have been concluded. The sale will face strong opposition. Prominent Senators such as Patrick Leahy (D-VT) have already written to the President to express their opposition to the deal, and key House members ranging from Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and House International Relations Committee Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) have also weighed in against it. In a November 10, 1996 letter to the Washington Post, Rep.

Gilman revealed that he had informed Clinton Administration representatives in the summer of 1996 that if they went forward with the proposed F-16 sale in the face of the Suharto regime's crackdown on opposition political leaders that he would "introduce a resolution of disapproval and convene an early meeting of our full committee for the purpose of reporting my resolution to the full house." Gilman further noted that in the light of the revelations regarding the Lippo Group and Indonesian money in the 1996 elections, "I have requested the Secretary of State to withhold action on this proposal until the many questions now raised by the Lippo Group investigation can be resolved."

Major non-governmental organizations that have already taken a stand against the sale include the National Council of Churches, Human Rights Watch, the Federation of American Scientists, Peace Action (the largest grassroots peace organization in the United States), and the East Timor Action Network. Possible Congressional actions could range from resolutions of disapproval blocking the deal outright to amendments conditioning the sale of any further weaponry to Indonesia on the improvement of human rights and democratic process in Indonesia and East Timor.

The Clinton Administration's various rationales for going ahead with the sale are contradictory at best. In the context of defending himself against charges of influence peddling in the matter of Indonesian contributions to his campaign, President Clinton has made a point of arguing that he has been harder on Indonesia than the Bush Administration was, citing a ban that the State Department has imposed on the sale of small arms from the U.S. to Indonesia as evidence of his tough stand. Selling F-16 fighters, but not handguns or rifles, sends the Suharto regime a mixed message at best regarding the consequences of its ongoing record of repression and human rights abuses.

At an October 11 briefing, White House spokesperson Mike McCurry tried to carve out an exception for the F-16 sale, asserting that "our goal in arms transfers in that region is to promote stability . . . not to engage in anything resembling the repression of individual rights . . . You don't use F-16s to kill civilians in crackdowns on dissidents." During Congressional testimony in September, Assistant Defense Secretary Kurt Campbell sounded the "stability, not repression" theme as well when he argued for the Indonesian F-16 sale on the grounds that "a regionally respected armed forces with credible defensive capabilities that trains and operates in a non-threatening manner is an important contributor to regional stability."

All of these arguments overlook the fact that the Indonesian military has been the instrument for Jakarta's illegal occupation of East Timor, during which time over 200,000 people have been killed. Selling advanced weaponry to the Suharto regime at the very moment that it is engaged in a crackdown on dissent within Indonesia and an acceleration of repression in East Timor sends exactly the wrong message: that whatever abuses it may engage in, and whatever slaps on the wrist it may receive from the Clinton Administration as a result, when push comes to shove the U.S. will support the Suharto regime and its military apparatus regardless of its brutal, lawless behavior. Furthermore, while F-16s may not be used directly to put down street demonstration or torture human rights activists, the Indonesian military's ability to sustain its illegal hold over East Timor ultimately rests on all of the weaponry it has at its disposal (including tanks and advanced combat aircraft like the F-16), not just the items used in day-to-day repression.

Related under articles: U.S Arms transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997
Table of Contents
Introduction
Soeharto and U.S Arms
F-16 Pending Project
Who will pick up the tab?


Link On:


Book's review: 
The 2009 Import and Export Market for Non-Military Arms in Asia
Import and Export Market in Asia
 

Suharto: A Political Biography
Failure to End Military Business Activity
Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978-98 (Studies on Contemporary China)
The Rise and Fall of Chinese Military Business

READ MORE - F-16 Project from U.S Arms to Soeharto
 
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