Sunday, April 19, 2009

Preface book of "Lifting the Curtain on the 1st Coup of October 1 1965 Suing for the Justice"

Indonesian Coup on 1 October 1965, The biggest Indonesian massacre
Preface
This Book is a compilation of articles and emails concerning “Coup d´ètat of October 1st 1965” in Indonesia, which I read and collected from the Internet and mailing lists between September – October 2005 during the Commemoration of 40 years National Tragedy of the Republic of Indonesia (October 1 1965 – October 1 2005) with the aim, to uncover the 40 years mystery of the Indonesian massacres.

As a young person, born 1983 and living outside Indonesia, I would like to know thereasons, why my father, Willy R. Wirantaprawira, who was sent by Indonesian Government to study in East Europe (1963 – 1968), since he was 24 years old until
today, more than 42 years, has to live in exile outside his home country.
All articles and emails in this book are presented without changes or comments. All rights of all articles are reserved by the mentioned authors. This book is to be
distributed free of charge to libraries in Indonesia and abroad and to those, who have not the possibility to get digital information through the Internet.
Dedicated to all Indonesians, the victims of General Soeharto´s regime living inside
and outside the country

Heidelberg, Germany on September – October 2005
Cyntha Wirantaprawira
cynth@wirantaprawira.net
http://www.wirantaprawira.org/privat/cyntha/

It is a human right for all Indonesian citizens to know the Truth about the Coup
of October 1st 1965

The Guilt of Vorfathers, who were accused to have connection with the Coup of
1st October 1965, is not to be carried over to their children and grandchildren
The Insurrection of Free Aceh Movement, who rebelled against
the United Republic of Indonesia
were granted an amnesty and were rehabilitated

Otherwise………
READ MORE - Preface book of "Lifting the Curtain on the 1st Coup of October 1 1965 Suing for the Justice"

CIA activities during the coup in Indonesia at 1965

Behind Indonesian Coup October 1965 that has relation with CIA Activities and Propaganda CIA in Indonesia. One of the biggest world conspiracy brought the biggest massacre in Indonesia.

From book of :

"Lifting the Curtain on the 1st Coup of October 1 1965
Suing for the Justice
Menguak Tabir Peristiwa 1 Oktober 1965 Mencari Keadilan "


Kathy Kadane *)

"...in four months,
five times as many
people died in
Indonesia as in
Vietnam in
twelve years."

-- Bertrand Russell, 1966

More from Kathy Kadane...

Link on:
Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia (New Perspectives in Se Asian Studies)
A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia (Prepared in Jan. 1966)
End of Sukarno:A Coup That Misfired: A Purge That Ran Wild
Indonesia, 1965: The coup that backfired

A Letter to the Editor, New York Review of Books, April 10, 1997

To the Editors:

I very much admired Ms. Laber's piece on Indonesian politics and the origins of the Soeharto regime. In connection with her assertion that little is known about a CIA (or US) role in the 1965 coup and the army massacre that followed, I would like to make your readers aware of a compelling body of evidence about this that is publicly available, but the public access to it is little known.

It consists of a series of on-the-record, taped interviews with the men who headed the US embassy in Jakarta or were at high levels in Washington agencies in 1965. I published a news story based on the interviews in The Washington Post ("U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60s," May 21, 1990), and have since transferred the tapes, my notes, and a small collection of documents, including a few declassified cables on which the story was based, to the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. The Archive is a nongovernmental research institute and library, located at the George Washington University.

The former officials interviewed included Ambassador Marshall Green, Deputy Chief of Mission Jack Lydman, Political Counsellor (later Ambassador) Edward E. Masters, Robert Martens (an analyst of the Indonesian left working under Masters' supervision), and (then) director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Far East division, William Colby.

The tapes, along with notes of conversations, show that the United States furnished critical intelligence -- the names of thousands of leftist activists, both Communist and non-Communist -- to the Indonesian Army that were then used in the bloody manhunt.

There were other details that illustrate the depth of US involvement and culpability in the killings which I learned from former top-level embassy officials, but have not previously published. For example, the US provided key logistical equipment, hastily shipped in at the last minute as Soeharto weighed the risky decision to attack. Jeeps were supplied by the Pentagon to speed troops over Indonesia's notoriously bad roads, along with "dozens and dozens" of field radios that the Army lacked. As Ms. Laber noted, the US (namely, the Pentagon) also supplied "arms." Cables show these were small arms, used for killing at close range.

The supply of radios is perhaps the most telling detail. They served not only as field communications but also became an element of a broad, US intelligence-gathering operation constructed as the manhunt went forward. According to a former embassy official, the Central Intelligence Agency hastily provided the radios -- state-of-the-art Collins KWM-2s, high-frequency single-sideband transceivers, the highest-powered mobile unit available at that time to the civilian and commercial market. The radios, stored at Clark Field in the Philippines, were secretly flown by the US Air Force into Indonesia. They were then distributed directly to Soeharto's headquarters -- called by its acronym KOSTRAD -- by Pentagon representatives. The radios plugged a major hole in Army communications: at that critical moment, there were no means for troops on Java and the out-islands to talk directly with Jakarta.

While the embassy told reporters the US had no information about the operation, the opposite was true. There were at least two direct sources of information. During the weeks in which the American lists were being turned over to the Army, embassy officials met secretly with men from Soeharto's intelligence unit at regular intervals concerning who had been arrested or killed. In addition, the US more generally had information from its systematic monitoring of Army radios. According to a former US official, the US listened in to the broadcasts on the US-supplied radios for weeks as the manhunt went forward, overhearing, among other things, commands from Soeharto's intelligence unit to kill particular persons at given locations.

The method by which the intercepts were accomplished was also described. The mobile radios transmitted to a large, portable antenna in front of KOSTRAD (also hastily supplied by the US -- I was told it was flown in in a C-130 aircraft). The CIA made sure the frequencies the Army would use were known in advance to the National Security Agency. NSA intercepted the broadcasts at a site in Southeast Asia, where its analysts subsequently translated them. The intercepts were then sent on to Washington, where analysts merged them with reports from the embassy. The combined reporting, intercepts plus "human" intelligence, was the primary basis for Washington's assessment of the effectiveness of the manhunt as it destroyed the organizations of the left, including, inter alia, the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI.

A word about the relative importance of the American lists. It appears the CIA had some access prior to 1965 to intelligence files on the PKI housed at the G-2 section of the Indonesian Army, then headed by Major-General S. Parman. CIA officials had been dealing with Parman about intelligence concerning the PKI, among other matters, in the years prior to the coup, according to a former US official who was involved (Parman was killed in the coup). The former official, whose account was corroborated by others whom I interviewed, said that the Indonesian lists, or files, were considered inadequate by US analysts because they identified PKI officials at the "national" level, but failed to identify thousands who ran the party at the regional and municipal levels, or who were secret operatives, or had some other standing, such as financier.

When asked about the possible reason for this apparent inadequacy, former US Ambassador Marshall Green, in a December 1989 interview, characterized his understanding this way:

I know that we had a lot more information than the Indonesians themselves.... For one thing, it would have been rather dangerous [for the Indonesian military to construct such a list] because the Communist Party was so pervasive and [the intelligence gatherers] would be fingered...because of the people up the line [the higher-ups, some of whom sympathized with the PKI]. In the [Indonesian] Air Force, it would have been lethal to do that. And probably that would be true for the police, the Marines, the Navy -- in the Army, it depended. My guess is that once this thing broke, the Army was desperate for information as to who was who [in the PKI].

By the end of January 1966, US intelligence assessments comparing the American lists with the reports of those arrested or killed showed the Army had destroyed the PKI. The general attitude was one of great relief: "Nobody cared" about the butchery and mass arrests because the victims were Communists, one Washington official told me.


-- Kathy Kadane


See also:

Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs, 58, Summer 1985, pp. 239-264.
Available at http://www.pir.org/scott.html

Link on: 
BIZARRE MYSTERY MAGAZINE - Volume 1, number 1 - October Oct 1965: One Drop of Blood; The Horror at Red Hook; The Rats of Dr Picard; The Living Statue; Coup de Grace; A Civilized Community; The Renter; That Warm Dead Brain; Leader of the Revolution 
The Year of Living Dangerously 
Indonesia Under Suharto: A Study in the Concentration of Power 
The role of the Partai National Indonesia (PNI) during the October Coup of 1965 and the general elections of 1971


Book's review:

The Sukarno File, 1965-1967: Chronology of a Defeat (Social Sciences in Asia)
The Sukarno File, 1965-1967: Chronology of a Defeat
A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia
A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965

Che Guevara Reader: Writings by Ernesto Che Guevara on Guerrilla Strategy, Politics & Revolution
A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965
READ MORE - CIA activities during the coup in Indonesia at 1965

Sunday, April 12, 2009

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Friday, March 13, 2009

The fact of Conflicts on Poso



Conflicts on Poso, Central Sulawesi-Indonesia

Maybe, The National Intelligence Agency (BIN) has to take apart with this condition or they already know the main problem then they only see and take it easy with the conditions. (Indonesia, The land which full of intrigue and conspiracy. We have to change this condition)

Most of the sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi, both during the Moluccan conflict and at the present time, has been concentrated on the coastal town of Poso and its surrounding district. What marks Central Sulawesi as special is that it is more or less divided equally between Muslims and Christians. On Poso, there is an imbalance weighted in favor of Muslims. Muslims number 44.99% of the total population in Poso regency, Christians are 39.10%, Catholics 2.5% while the rest are Hindu and Buddhist.

The protagonists of violence on Poso were not only members of Lashkar Jihad, according to The International Crisis Group's Asia Report No 43 of December 11, 2002 (full pdf document can be obtained from HERE, with registration required).

The terror group Jemaah Islamiyah was behind some of the Islamic militia groups active on Poso. These had names such as Laskar Jundullah (army of Allah). There were several groups of this name, but one was formed in September 2000 as the military wing of KPPSI, the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law. This was headed by Agus Dwikarna, later imprisoned as a JI member in the Philippines. Though officially based in Makasar, it had its military headquarters at Poso. It recruited members of another Islamic 'army", Laskar Mujahidin, and also the group Darul Islam.


Darul Islam, founded in the 1940s with the aim of establishing a Caliphate in southeast Asia, had provided Jemaah Islamiyah with many of its core members. From 1953 to 1962, Darul Islam launched a rebellion on Aceh in northwestern Indonesia. It also had rebellions in West Java and South Sulawesi in the 1950s. It still exists, and a cell on West Java has links with Noordin Top, the JI financier and recruiter.

Link on: 
Darul-Islam: Kartosuwirjos Kampf um einen islamischen Staat Indonesien (Beitrage zur Sudasienforschung) (German Edition) 
Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior 
Gerakan Islam tradisional di Malaysia: Jamat Tabligh & Darul Arqum 
Islam in Indonesia: A survey of events and developments from 1988 to March 1993 (Seri INIS) 
M. Natsir dan Darul Islam: Studi kasus Aceh dan Sulawesi Selatan tahun 1953-1958

JI was founded in Malaysia around 1995 by Abdullah Sungkar. Sungkar in the 1970s also founded the Pondok Ngruki (also called Al Mukmin), the Islamic pesantren in Solo, about 250 miles east of Jakarta. He had co-founded this school with the "spiritual leader" of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir. About 30 known or suspected Islamic terrorists have attended this pesantren.

Bashir was arrested and jailed for "giving his consent" to the 2002 Bali bombings. Currently there are three conspirators involved in the 2003 bombings, who are awaiting imminent execution. One of these, Amrozi, had attended the Pondok Ngruki school, led by Bashir, and said that it was a "JI institution". Another of those awaiting death by firing squad is Imam Samudra. The Laskar Mujahidin was linked to the Ngruki school and the MMI, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), which had been founded by Bashir and others in August 2000.

According to the International Crisis Group, Samudra was directly involved with recruiting for the "jihad" on Poso and the Moluccas.

From his base in a training camp in Cimalati, Pandeglang regency in Banten province (West Java), Samudra would send JI operatives who were to recruit people for jihadist operations in Poso and Ambon. These would approach students, and would invite them to meetings, where they would be shown video CDs of the wars in Ambon and Poso. These videos would be produced by Mujahideen KOMPAK, an affiliate of JI, and would document atrocities supposedly carried out by Christians. After this, there followed about four months of study and discussion about the impending darkness that would come unless they fought for jihad. When the recruits were considered ready, they would be sent to fight in Poso and Ambon.

Other groups involved in the fighting on Poso included Adnan Arsal's Komite Perjuangan Muslim Poso ( KPMP). By the time Lashkar Jihad disbanded in early October, 2002, it had chased out the fighters of the smaller group Laskar Mujahidin from Poso.

Link on:  
Tafsir - Ul - Qur'an, Translation and Commentary of the Holy Qur'an, 4 Vols. 
Kebangkitan Islam Di kalangan pelajar
The Message of Al-Quran

The initial trigger for the violence in Poso and the Moluccas began in 1998, when the dictator Haji Mohamed Suharto was finally forced to resign in 1998. During his rule of twenty-one years' duration, he had forcefully suppressed Islamist groups in Indonesia. Under his rule, the tradition on Poso was to have the regional governor or bupati alternate from a Muslim, then to a Christian and back, to keep some sense of impartiality and equilibrium. In 1998, the Muslim bupati, Arief Patanga, announced that his successor was to be a member of his family, rather than a Christian, breaking the tradition.

In the Christmas period of 1998, a minor fight broke out in Poso, outside a small mosque. As a result, Poso erupted into violence. The city was left a smoldering wreck as a result of the first conflict (below).
The fighting which took place led to churches being burned, such as the Oikumene Iradat Puri Church in Palu. The Reverend Irianto Kongkoli, who was shot dead on October 16, placed the blame for the Poso violence on the regent or bupati, Arief Patanga, who officially held his post from 1992 to 1997. As we noted earlier, he said: "The one who should be severely punished is Arief Patanga. "Christian homes and churches continued to be destroyed sporadically until April 2000 when the Muslim on Christian violence reached another peak. Then, there was mounted a retaliation.

A group called the Black Bat was involved in the Christian attacks, as was another called the Red Group. As jihadists had either voluntarily come to Poso to engage in the violence or had been sent by JI and Lashkar Jihad, an influx of Christians had also come to take part in the reprisals.

Among the individuals who had come to Poso in April-May to join the counter-attack against Muslims were Christians from East Nusa Tenggara province, which lies south of Sulawesi island. Three individuals who came to Poso at this time were Catholics, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu.
Their alleged involvement, and their subsequent fate, are instrumental in understanding some of the excesses of the Poso conflicts from the time of the Moluccan war, and also in understanding the violence which is currently engulfing Poso.

 Link On:
De Oorsprong van de Priestertaal in Poso
Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia
Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia (Nijmegen Studies in Development and Cultural Change (NICCOS))
Between Cross and Crescent: Christian and Muslim Perspectives on Malcolm and Martin (History of African-American Religions)
Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950. Translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jansen. Second Revised Edition. ... Encounter 7) (Currents of Encounter Series)

The three men are said to have gone into an area where violence was raging to evacuate children from a church-led school in the village of Moengko, Poso City. A Muslim mob came to the church on May 23, 2000 and burned the church down. The children and the three men escaped before the building was razed.
These three men were, however, accused of inciting murders of Muslims, and orchestrating the violence which happened in the phase of the conflict during May 2000.

The Christian on Muslim violence was as horrific as anything mounted by the Muslims. In one village, Sintuwulemba, an estimated 300 Muslims were massacred. Their bodies were thrown in the Poso river, where they floated out to sea.

A peace accord was signed in August 2000, and though the conflict did not cease, it subsided substantially. However, in April 2001, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu were sentenced to death in a court case that was marked by crowds of Muslims calling for their death. It has been argued that the three men received an unfair trial, and that the judges ordered their deaths to appease the baying Muslim mob surrounding the Palu courthouse.

The death sentence caused a resurgence of the conflict, and in August 2001, Lashkar Jihad arrived in force to wage their war, burning Christian villages around Poso. Other Islamist groups had already been operating for some time by then. Many of the Christians took refuge in the highland lakeside town of Tentena, which is predominantly Christian.

The government intervened and the Malino Accord was brokered in December of that year. In January and February large stockpiles of weapons grew as fighters surrendered them to provincial authorities, but soon, the terms of the Accord were being breached by both sides. The Christians of the region were now without weapons, even though killings of Christians continued.

One individual who had signed the Malino Accord in December 2001 became a victim of its "justice" in August 2002. In mid August, two Muslim attacks took place upon villages near Poso. Three Christians were killed in Peleru, and Mayumba came under siege shortly after. Reverend Rinaldy Damanik, the head of the Protestant Church in the Central Sulawesi region, had helped to evacuate Christians from both villages. He was arrested on August 17 as his lorry was being besieged by jihadists. Police arrested him, and claimed that he was transporting 14 rifles and explosives. Under the terms of Malino, trafficking in weapons carried a sentence of either 12 years' jail or death by firing squad.

While in prison in Palu, awaiting trial, an attempt was made to poison Rev. Damanik on December 26, 2002, the fourth anniversary of the start of the Poso conflict. He was hospitalized as a result. He was placed on trial on February 3, 2003 and on 16 June, 2003, he was given a three year jail term. He was finally released in November 2004.

The main conflict only came to end in October 2002, when Lashkar Jihad announced that its main fighting wing in Poso, the Zabir, would leave the region of conflict. It was at this time that Laskar Jihad was voluntarily dissolving itself. It has been suggested that this had happened because Jafar Umar Thalib, who had been arrested in April 2002 for a speech made at Ambon mosque, in which he threatened not only Christians, but the government, was awaiting his trial. It was suggested that the group dissolved itself as a measure to stop Thalib becoming jailed. Whether the group is really inactive, or merely dormant, is not so clear.
Source: http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003258.html

Link:
Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: National Case Studies

Book's review:

Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
 
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
Islam Beyond Conflict (Law, Ethics and Governance)
READ MORE - The fact of Conflicts on Poso

Indonesian Military and U.S. Business

"No Body Knows behind The Fact of Rebellion in Indonesia, We Only know that rebellion is  worst. So who is the most benefit from that rebellion? You'll never predict it before. Open Ur mind 'n eyes."


Indonesian Military and U.S. Business: A Winning Combination?

Reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and a growing consensus within the Bush administration all view the military as central to Indonesia’s stability, especially in the strife ridden provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. But the characterization of the military as a stabilizing force ignores the military’s strong incentives for prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Aceh and Irian Jaya. 


In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch, a researcher for the Bonn International Center for Conversion, describes the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. As much as 80% of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution and illegal casinos and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan.[73] 


Former Defense Minister Juwono conceded in an interview with McCulloch that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence," leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million.[74] In Aceh, soldiers sell their weapons to the guerillas for as little as $6, ensuring their enemies remain a potent force.[75] Many soldiers and officials go so far as to refer to the Aceh fight as a "project," highlighting the role the war plays in filling their pockets, winning them promotions and keeping the institution as a whole powerful and relevant.[76] 


While this is a winning combination for the Indonesian military and multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport, not to mention a vital market for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the people who live and work in the areas "protected" by the Indonesian military gain nothing but more suffering. Until this dynamic can be fully outlined and understood, arguments for arming the Indonesian military in order to ensure stability and end conflict must not be taken at face value.


Related Under this articles: A Stabilizing force by military in Indonesia
 Source:Indonesia at the Crossroads
A Special Report
by Frida Berrigan
September 2001

Indonesia is "on the road to becoming a real democracy." 
Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense


Link on:
Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia-US Military Alliance Is Being Revived; Jakarta Mulls Leaving OPEC.: An article from: APS Diplomat News Service
Disarming politics: if Aceh's military is to leave politics to the people, Indonesia's must as well.(INDONESIA): An article from: New Internationalist


United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years
The Forces Postal Service in Borneo During the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966
Economic Crisis and Vulnerability: The Story from Southeast Asia
Aceh, Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State (The Ethnography of Political Violence)



Book's review:
Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force (Books and Monographs)
Indonesia's Use of Military Force
Out of Business and on Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia
Out of Business and on Budget

Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch (Politics in Asia)
Indonesia's War over Aceh
Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons
Security Operations in Aceh
 
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